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JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals is 
conferred by Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(k) and by Order of 
the Supreme Court of Utah dated August 18, 1993 pouring-over this 
case. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
FIRST ISSUE - (POINT I); 
1. Did the District Court err by hearing the 
defendant/appellee's Motion for Relief from Order either because 
no new facts were presented in support or because the motion was 
contrary to the "law of the case" doctrine (i.e., a District 
Court judge may not vacate the prior decision of another District 
Court judge)? 
Standard of Review 
Trial Judge David Young reviewed the determination of 
his predecessor, and determined, as a matter of law, that 
Judge Wilkinson's decision was incorrect. This exercise of 
appellate review is entitled to no deference. Harward v. 
Harward, 526 P.2d 1183 (Utah 1974). 
SECOND ISSUE - (POINT II AND III): 
2. Was summary dismissal of plaintiff/appellant's 
causes of action in error because employment policy statements 
and conduct, when considered in a light most favorable to Power, 
establish an implied-in-fact employment relationship whereby she 
could only be terminated for cause, after disciplinary 
counseling, and an opportunity to correct deficiencies? 
Standard of Review 
Because summary judgment was granted as a matter of 
law, this Court may review the trial court's conclusions of law 
without according them any deference, viewing the facts in the 
light most favorable to Appellant. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. 
State, 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989). 
Summary judgment is not appropriate where a genuine 
issue of material fact exists and where, on the basis of the 
facts in the record, reasonable minds could differ. Jackson v. 
Dabnev, 645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982). 
THIRD I88UE - (POINT IV): 
Did the trial court err in concluding that 
plaintiff/appellant's termination was part of a reduction in 
force and "when it became necessary to reduce employees, the 
plaintiff was let go for that reason alone" [March 18, 1993 
Memorandum Decision, p. 5, R. at 984.] when that finding is 
inconsistent with competent evidence and when defendant/appellee 
failed to provide any documentation of a reduction in force in 
response to discovery requests by Power. 
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Because summary judgment was granted as a matter of 
law, this Court may review the trial court's conclusions of law 
without according them any deference, viewing the facts in the 
light most favorable to Appellant. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. 
State, 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Rules 56 and 60(b)(7), Utah Rules Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of Case. 
Plaintiff and Appellant, Mariamercedes Power, was hired 
by Defendant and Appellee, Riverview Financial Corporation 
("Riverview" a/k/a Mrs. Fields Cookies) on December 1, 1988. She 
was terminated after approximately 13 months of employment. 
Power brought an action against Riverview in the Third Judicial 
District Court for Summit County, State of Utah alleging that her 
termination violated an implied-in-fact agreement that she would 
only be terminated for cause. 
Passages in Riverview's documents and explicit 
statements and actions by company executives created an implied-
in-fact agreement that Power would not be terminated without 
cause and then only after remedial and disciplinary procedures 
had been followed. Power claims that she was terminated without 
cause, not as part of a reduction in force, as claimed by 
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Riverview. Power was given no warning of performance 
difficulties and no corrective instruction or opportunity to 
improve. 
II. Course of Proceedings, 
Significantly, this case is pending in the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Summit County. As such, it 
has been subject to the revolving trial judge arrangements 
prevailing on that bench. On November 25, 1991, a hearing was 
held before then-sitting Judge Homer Wilkinson on Riverview's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 407.) Judge Wilkinson 
denied summary judgment on Power's claim of an implied-in-fact 
contract. (R. at 408.) 
Before an order was entered, Riverview filed a Motion 
for Reconsideration of the court's denial of summary judgment on 
the implied-in-fact contract issue. (R. at 409-424.) Power 
opposed reconsideration. (R. at 425-429.) On February 19, 1992, 
Judge Wilkinson , having considered Riverview's Motion for 
Reconsideration, entered a Minute Entry allowing the implied-in-
fact contact claim to remain. (R. at 453.) 
Between July 1, 1992 and December 31, 1992, the 
presiding trial judge was Frank G. Noel. On July 13, 1992, he 
entered a Scheduling Order setting jury trial for November 10 
through 12, 1992. (R. at 496.) On August 11, 1992, Riverview 
4 
filed a Motion in Limine seeking to preclude evidence at trial of 
Riverview's specific promises of fairness and Riverview's stated 
discipline policy. (R. at 500-526.) Riverview claimed these 
statements and standards were irrelevant to the jury question of 
whether it had abandoned or waived the at-will presumption. Yet, 
this was the very evidence on which Judge Wilkinson relied in 
denying Riverview summary judgment (and reconsideration) on the 
implied-in-fact employment contract issue. 
Power opposed the Motion in Limine, again with 
extensive citation to the depositions, documents and affidavits 
supporting a "for cause" employment agreement and the right to 
notice of concerns and an opportunity to remediate before 
termination. (R. at 544-595.) Judge Noel denied the Motion in 
Limine (R. at 709) specifically finding that Power's evidence of 
an implied-in-fact contract was sufficient to require jury 
consideration, and citing to Judge Wilkinson's earlier decisions 
on the matter. (See Judge Noel's November 20, 1992, Minute Entry 
at Addendum.) 
While Riverview's Motion in Limine was pending, a 
scheduling conflict arose on the Court's calendar. By Minute 
Entry dated November 10, 1992, Judge Noel moved the trial to 
December 15, 1992, in place of the trial scheduled in the 
companion case of Joe Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies (District 
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Court Case No. 10756; now pending on appeal in this Court as Case 
No. 930635-CA). (R. at 705.) The parties proceeded to trial on 
December 15th, selected a jury, presented opening statements, 
started Power's direct testimony, and screened Riverview's 
training video "What We Stand For." Unfortunately, on the 
morning of the second day of trial, a difficulty arose with one 
of the jurors who first claimed economic hardship from jury duty, 
and then claimed that he had made up his mind and could not hear 
the rest of the trial fairly. It was eventually determined that 
the juror was intoxicated and could no longer participate in the 
proceedings. The parties were unable to agree on how to proceed 
with just seven jurors, and so a mistrial was ordered. Judge 
Noel rescheduled trial for March 23, 1993. 
On January 1, 1993, Judge David S. Young took the 
Summit County District Court bench. On January 15, 1993, he 
sighed a Minute Entry confirming the trial date of March 23, 1993 
(R. at 807), but on February 26, 1993, he postponed the trial to 
April 15, 1993. (R. at 811.) 
On March 1, 1993, Riverview filed a Motion for Relief 
From [Judge Wilkinson's] Order which had denied summary judgment 
on Power's claim of an implied-in-fact employment contract. (R. 
at 812-813.) In support of its Motion for Relief (f/k/a a 
"motion to reconsider"), Riverview cited the publication of two 
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Utah Supreme Court opinions as the basis for reconsideration. No 
new facts were offered in support of the Motion for Relief. In 
fact, Riverview's 122-page supporting memorandum consisted 
principally of copies of its legal memorandums supporting prior 
motions. Power objected to the Motion for Relief both on the 
merits and on the propriety of a district court judge overruling 
the "law of the case" as established by another district court 
judge. (R. at 938-943.) 
Judge Young heard the motion on March 18, 1993 (R. at 
1091-1132, copy of transcript in Addendum). The hearing was in 
Judge Young's Third District courtroom in Salt Lake City without 
benefit of the file, which was in the Clerk's Office in 
Coalville, Summit County. Judge Young granted the Motion to 
Reconsider that same day. In his Memorandum Decision Judge Young 
usurped the jury's function by concluding that "[i]n the instant 
case, reasonable minds cannot differ as to the fact that the 
evidence was not strong enough to overcome the presumption that 
an "at will" relationship continued and that the company had done 
nothing to change the "at-will" relationship with this plaintiff. 
All assurances remained consistent with the "at-will" status and 
when it became necessary to reduce employees, the plaintiff was 
let go for that reason alone." (R. at 983-984, emphasis 
supplied.) 
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An Order granting Riverview summary judgment on the 
claim for breach of an implied-in-fact employment contract was 
entered on May 25, 1993. (R. at 986-988, copy in Addendum.) In 
the Order, Judge Young reiterated his conclusion that "the 
undisputed facts establish as a matter of law that Plaintiff's 
employment relationship with Defendant was *at-will7 and that, 
regardless, Defendant terminated Plaintiff ^for cause' as part of 
a reduction-in-force." This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In November 1988, Power quit her job, cancelled a 
job interview with another company and accepted employment with 
Riverview after having the policies of the company explained to 
her by E.G. Perry, the personal assistant and secretary to Debbi 
Fields. (See Amended Complaint at f 3; Power Depo., p. 34, R. at 
322-333.) Ms. Perry's introductory explanation was: 
[I]t was a wonderful company to work for. 
That there would be many opportunities for 
advancement. That with my experience, I 
would go far with the company. I was given 
the company policy and procedures manuals 
that indicated that it was a fair company. 
That if you were a hard worker, conscientious 
worker, you would be there until you chose to 
terminate the employment. 
(R. at 323.) 
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2. During Power's employment, Riverview's Policy and 
Procedures Manual contained the following words of limitation to 
the company's right to terminate employment at-will: 
Philosophy. . . . 
For example, no person should be terminated 
if he or she did not know, or should not have 
known, what was expected. . . . 
If an employee, for some reason is not 
performing to expectations, you should verify 
that he/she understands what he/she must do 
to be performing successfully. 
(Personnel Section 7.0 - Disciplinary Process - R. at 335.) 
3. Personnel Section 7.0 also describes as General 
Rules: 
DID THE EMPLOYEE KNOW OR SHOULD HE/SHE HAVE 
KNOWN OF THE DISCIPLINARY CONSEQUENCES OF 
HIS/HER CONDUCT? . . . 
A trivial offense does not merit harsh 
discipline unless the employee was guilty of 
the same or similar offense a number of times 
in the past. 
(R. at 336, emphasis in original.) 
4. Personnel Section 7.0 enumerates "Violations that 
are Grounds for Immediate Termination." (R. at 338-339.) All of 
the listed grounds for termination involve misfeasance on the 
part of the employee. Power was not terminated for any 
misfeasance. 
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5. During Power's employment, she saw the video film 
"What We Stand For", in which Riverview founders and principal 
officers Randy and Debbi Fields declare the overriding philosophy 
of the company, Debbi Fields says, "The fourth component: fair 
treatment of all—this is part of our foundation." And then 
Randy Fields explains what this principle means: 
We mean to treat people fairly. . . . Treat 
somebody that reports to you exactly the way 
you would want to be treated. Let me give 
you an example of what's not fair. Let's 
suppose vou have somebody that's not a good 
performer. . . . Here's what's not fair: not 
saying anything to them, then scheduling them 
out of the company. . . . That's not fair. 
Let me tell you what else is not fair. 
Without warning, you walk in for some 
relatively minor infraction of the rules and 
firing them. They never knew that they were 
doing something wrong—they had no 
communication on the subject whatsoever. 
That's not fair. . . . 
On the other hand, you understand that it is 
perfectly fair to fire someone? There is a 
fair way to do that? Absolutely a fair way 
to do that. And what we mean by fair is in 
some sense a communication issue. . . . 
"Hold accountable" means something really 
simple. That once I've instructed you as to 
how you are to be or to behave . . . and once 
you have got that and demonstrated that you 
understand it, then my expectation is that 
that's how it will be, and failure to do that 
results in discipline and ultimately 
continued failure to do it results in leaving 
the job at our request. That's a polite way 
of describing being fired. (Randy Fields, 
Transcript - "What We Stand For," pp. 14-15.) 
Debbi Fields corroborates Randy's explanation: 
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I want to make sure that people are treated 
fairly. That this company represents a code 
of ethics and that we will work to make sure 
that everybody in this organization is told 
how to be better, how to be more effective. . 
We're not perfect. . . . I'm going to make 
mistakes. So I always need correction or 
need direction and if I need it, I can 
guarantee you'll need it. (Debbi Fields, 
Transcript -"What We Stand For", pp. 16-17). 
(R. at 298-299.) 
6. In April 1989, Power was promoted to the Position 
of Administrative Assistant to Paul Baird, Director of 
Operations. (R. at 299.) 
7. While Power was his Administrative Assistant, Paul 
Baird terminated several employees. In every termination of 
which Power was aware, each employee received a written 
Performance Improvement Plan, and was then given a chance to 
correct that performance. (Power Depo., p. 71, R. at 330.) 
8. Baird recommended and gave Power a 10% Bonus 
because her performance exceeded expectations in the third 
quarter of 1989, her first full quarter as his Administrative 
Assistant. (Baird Depo., p. 65, R. at 345; and Performance 
Evaluation -3rd Qtr., R. at 353.) 
9. In the fourth quarter of 1989, Baird told Power she 
was going to be elevated to management of Riverview's $15 million 
Mail Order operation. (Power Depo., p. 158, R. at 333.) This 
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plan was announced at the November 1989 "Top Gun" meeting in Park 
City. Id. 
10. Then, on January 8, 1990, Baird terminated Power 
without warning, claiming at the termination interview that her 
performance had "dramatically fallen off." Baird did so without 
previously informing Power of her alleged lack of performance, or 
determining that she knew what was expected of her, and then 
giving her a chance to improve her performance. (Baird Depo., p. 
71, R. at 347; Performance Evaluation - 4th Qtr., R. at 358-359; 
Power's January 19, 1990, letter to Debbi Fields, R. at 3 67, et 
seg.) 
11. In spite of Riverview's written standards for 
disciplinary due process; and in direct contradiction to 
Riverview's stated company principle of fairness which prohibits 
"not saying anything to [a poor performer], then scheduling them 
out of the company;" Baird terminated Power (or supposedly her 
position) because of poor performance which he never discussed 
with her before termination: "This lack of performance resulted 
in the position being eliminated on 12/31/89." (Performance 
Evaluation - 4th Qtr., R. at 359.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THERE WAS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR JUDGE YOUNG TO GRANT 
RELIEF FROM THE LAW OF THIS CASE. 
Rule 60(b)(7), Utah Rule of Civil Procedure, should be 
applied only in unusual or exceptional circumstances. Because 
Riverview did not introduce any new evidence and the cases cited 
by Riverview as support for its Motion did not change 
implied-in-fact employment contract law, Judge Young was not 
justified in "vacating" Judge Wilkinson's prior determination and 
entering summary judgment in its place. (R. at 986-988.) 
POINT II: THE EXISTENCE OF AN IMPLIED-IN-FACT EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT 
IS A FACT QUESTION FOR THE JURY. 
The question of whether the at-will employment 
presumption has been overcome is a question of fact reserved for 
the jury. The two cases cited by Riverview as justification for 
its motion, Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah, Inc., 844 P.2d 331 (Utah 1992) 
and Sanderson v. First Sec. Leasing, 844 P.2d 303 (Utah 1992), do 
not change the requirement that courts should interpret 
employment contracts by harmonizing the overall meaning of the 
contract within the totality of the employment circumstances. 
Power has alleged facts, which if true, would establish 
her reasonable expectation that her employment was not at-will. 
Riverview has not and cannot deny the existence of Power's 
evidence. Judge Young concluded in his Memorandum Decision that 
13 
Riverview "had done nothing to change the * at-will' relationship" 
with Power. (R. at 984.) This conclusion simply is not correct, 
and it improperly invades the province of the jury. 
POINT III: WHETHER THERE WAS A REDUCTION-IN-FORCE IS A QUESTION 
OP PACT FOR THE JURY. 
Riverview claims that the reduction-in-force was its 
"cause" to terminate Power. Power claims that this was a pretext 
which is not borne out by the facts and which is inconsistent 
with Riverview's other conduct and representations. But even if 
Riverview did have a legitimate reduction-in-force, Riverview's 
Director of Operations, Paul Baird, admitted that elimination of 
Power's job was inextricably linked to performance concerns. (R. 
at 359.) And it is undisputed that Riverview failed to fulfill 
Randy Field's pledge to apprise Power of performance problems, 
provide corrective instruction, and allow an opportunity for 
improvement before "scheduling" Power out of the company. These 
disputed factual issues are jury questions. Judge Young erred by 
focusing solely on Riverview's evidence and treating Riverview's 
invocation of reduction-in-force as per se cause, without 
evaluating the underlying circumstances and the overall context 
of the employment relationship. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR JUDGE YOUNG 
TO GRANT RELIEF FROM THE LAW OF THIS CASE 
Riverview relied on Rule 60(b)(7), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure for its Motion for Relief from [Judge Wilkinson's] 
Order. (R. at 812.) The Supreme Court of Utah follows the 
admonition that Rule 60(b)(7) "should be very cautiously and 
sparingly invoked by the Court only in unusual and exceptional 
circumstances." Laub v. South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n, 657 P.2d 
1304, 1307-1308 (Utah 1982) (quoting Hughes v. Sanders, 287 F. 
Supp. 332, 334 (E.D. Okla. 1968); See Lincoln Benefit Life Ins. 
Co. v. D.T. Southern Properties, 838 P.2d 672, 674 (Utah App. 
1992). This is not such a case. 
In order to obtain relief from Judge Wilkinson's two 
prior denials of summary judgment on the implied-in-facts 
employment contract issues, Riverview had to show unusual and 
exceptional circumstances. Laub, 657 P.2d at 1306; Lincoln 
Benefit, 838 P.2d at 674. Yet, there was nothing extraordinary 
for Judge Young to consider. In its Memorandum supporting 
reconsideration, Riverview simply deferred to its prior 
pleadings: "Rather than rehashing those facts, however, and in 
the interest of judicial economy, defendant simply refers the 
Court to the facts and analysis" in its memorandums supporting 
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motion for summary judgment. (R. at 816-817.) Riverview's 
motion was nothing more than an attempt for a third bite of the 
apple — an attempt motivated by what Judge Young admitted was 
"the undesirable nature of the master calendar system now 
followed in Summit County where the Judge will change as the 
assignment changes." (R. at 982.) 
The two new cases cited by Riverview to Judge Young did 
not justify the relief he granted. Sanderson v. First Sec. 
Leasing. 844 P.2d 303 (Utah 1992) and Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah, 
Inc., 844 P.2d 331 (Utah 1992) did not change the implied-in-fact 
employment contract analysis. If anything, Sanderson and Hodgson 
bolstered Judge Wilkinson's ruling that a reasonable jury could 
find that Riverview breached its implied-in-fact contract with 
Power, so the case could not be disposed of on summary judgment. 
Finally, Judge Young's Memorandum Decision was issued 
in Salt Lake City on the same day as oral argument and without 
benefit of the file which was in the Summit County Court Clerk's 
Office in Coalville. (R. at 1093.) Judge Young's only reference 
to Power's evidence was a summary of the extemporaneous review 
given by her counsel during oral argument in response to the 
trial court's inquiry. In reaching its conclusion the Court 
virtually ignored the voluminous record evidence of "for cause" 
employment drawn from documentary, video, oral, and 
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course-of-dealing sources. (R. at 68-73; and 295-316 with 
supporting evidence at 322-378.) Thus, not only did Judge Young 
grant the Motion to Reconsider without adequate demonstration of 
unusual and exceptional circumstances, he impermissibly reversed 
the law of the case by vacating Judge Wilkinson's prior 
decisions, disregarding Judge Noel's important ruling on 
Riverview's Motion in Limine (R. at 709, see Addendum), and 
entered summary judgment without giving Power's evidence the 
liberal inferences to which it is entitled. Berube v. Fashion 
Center, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1039 (Utah 1989). 
POINT II 
THE EXISTENCE OP AN IMPLIED-IN-FACT 
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT IS A FACT QUESTION FOR THE JURY 
The existence of an implied-in-fact contract "is a 
question of fact which turns on the objective manifestations of 
the parties7 intent. As a question of fact, the intent of the 
parties is primarily a jury question." Johnson v. Morton 
Thiokol. Inc.. 818 P.2d 997, 1001 (Utah 1991). Neither Hodgson 
nor Sanderson change the requirement that courts should interpret 
employment contract terms by harmonizing the overall meaning of 
the contract. Judge Wilkinsons denial of summary judgment 
reflects his understanding of that point. 
Justice Zimmerman in Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 
771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989) holds that "the representations made by 
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the employer in employee manuals, bulletins, and the like are 
legitimate sources for determining the apparent intentions of the 
parties." 771 P.2d at 1052. The same conclusion was reached in 
Gilmore v. Salt Lake Area Community Action Program, 775 P.2d 940 
(Utah App. 1989), "In order to determine the nature of the 
employment contract, the court should consider the intent of the 
parties and the totality of the circumstances." 775 P.2d at 943. 
In Gilmore. summary judgment was not appropriate, even though the 
plaintiff was hired as an at-will employee, because the employer 
later changed the employment contract terms by issuing a manual 
that outlined appeal and discipline procedures. Id. 
The same thing happened with Power in the present case, 
but several times over. Through company manuals; the 
foundational video, "What We Stand For"; conduct of Power's boss, 
Paul Baird; and verbal representations of other company 
officials, Power was given repeated and consistent assurances of 
a "for cause" employment relationship. If anything, Sanderson 
and Hodgson reinforce principles which supported Judge 
Wilkinson's prior orders: "The existence of an implied-in-fact 
contract is a factual question committed to the sound discretion 
of the jury." Sanderson. 844 P.2d 303 (Utah 1992); "Summary 
judgment is appropriate only if a reasonable jury cannot find 
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that an implied contract exists." Id., citing Caldwell v. Ford, 
Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc.. 777 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1989). 
In addition to Hodgson and Sanderson, the Utah Supreme 
Court also issued another employment law opinion between Judge 
Wilkinson's denial of summary judgment and Judge Young's 
reconsiderations. The opinion was Thurston v. Box Elder County, 
835 P.2d 165 (Utah 1992) where the Court held that an employer 
could create an "atmosphere" of fairness upon which employees may 
justifiably rely, and which creates implied-in-fact contract 
terms. In other words, private employers do not need to make 
specific implied contract promises to specific employees to 
create implied-in-fact contract terms, Id. Accord, Heslop v. 
Bank of Utah. 839 P.2d 828, 835-36 (Utah 1992) ("Berube works no 
substantial injustice by requiring employers who expressly or 
impliedly promise employment for other than at-will to stand by 
that promise.") 
This standard was specially briefed by Power (R. at 
955-979) after oral argument on Riverview's Motion for Relief 
because it had seemed to be a sticking point in Judge Young's 
analysis. (R. at 1128-1129.) Judge Young received that 
supplementary brief before issuing his March 18, 1993, Memorandum 
Decision. (R. at 984.) He decided incorrectly anyway. 
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POINT III 
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF RIVERVIEW'S INTENT 
AND POWER'S REASONABLE EXPECTATION 
OP "FOR CAUSE" CONTRACT TERMS 
Riverview did not dispute any of the factual citations 
in Power's memorandum to Judge Wilkinson opposing summary 
judgment (R. at 194-284) or in Power's memorandum to Judge Noel 
opposing Riverview's Motion in Limine (R. at 477-551) or her 
memorandum to Judge Young opposing Riverview's Motion for Relief 
(R. at 782-852). Rather, Riverview argued that in spite of 
Power's extensive documentary, video, and deposition evidence, no 
reasonable jury could find that Riverview relinquished the "at-
will" presumption. Riverview's Motion for Relief was a pure 
fact-finding invitation. It would be hard to articulate a case 
with clearer issues of material fact. 
A. Examination of Riverview's Factual Claims: 
Riverview's Handbook equivocates and suggests reliance 
on higher authorities for the actual terms and conditions of 
employment. "We do not expect this handbook to answer all of 
your questions. Your supervisor will be your major source of 
information." (R. at 176.) Power's supervisors and Riverview's 
owners themselves explained numerous times that termination 
required compliance with the disciplinary process: 
I was told by the company or a representative 
of the company that it was a fair place, 
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secure place to work, and that if there were 
any problems with performance or breaking one 
of their policies, that person would be 
notified and steps would be taken to remedy 
that situation and the employees would be 
given a fair chance to remedy whatever the 
situation was before they would be 
terminated. That a person would know fairly 
what was expected of them and what the 
performance was. 
(Power Depo., p. 69, lines 1-9, R. at 329.) Power understood 
this to be the policy from statements made by Debbi and Randy 
Fields, (discussed above) and from statements in the Policy and 
Procedures Manual. (Power Depo., p. 69, lines 10-22, R at 329.) 
While the handbook does "supersede all prior handbooks, 
manuals, policies and procedures issued by The Company," it also 
allows that "The Company" may, at any time, in its sole 
discretion, modify or vary from anything stated in this 
handbook." (R. at 176.) The conduct and oral representations of 
Riverview's management, Power's direct and higher supervisors, 
and the very owners of the Company did vary from the Handbook's 
equivocal reservation of the at-will presumption. 
These facts distinguish the case from the holding of 
Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, 818 P.2d 997 (Utah 1991), where the 
Supreme Court carefully determined that the employer complied 
with its procedures for termination of the plaintiff. In this 
case, Ms. Power's termination was improper because it did not 
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comply with the procedures for staged discipline and it was 
inconsistent with Riverview's express policies of fairness. 
B. Riverview's Handbook Is Not Dispositive: 
Riverview contends that Power admitted her at-will 
status on June 6, 1989 when she signed an "Acknowledgement of 
Receipt" (R. at 378.) for a "Mrs. Fields Team Member Handbook." 
The Acknowledgement of Receipt contained the statement, "The 
company reserves the right to . . . terminate me with or without 
cause at any time." However, this statement is part of a 
"Checklist" expressly requiring Power to acknowledge with her 
initials, and she didn't. There are only check marks in the 
space provided for initials. Power does not recall making or 
seeing the check marks on the form, and she disputes that she 
acknowledged her at-will status: 
To the best of my recollection, I signed this 
paper as an acknowledgement that I had 
received the handbook. I did not stop and 
think and analyze specific sentences. . . . 
But I know that it's just an acknowledgement 
of the handbook, not a specific area." (Power 
Depo., pp. 65-66, attached as "Exhibit A.") 
Even if Power did inadvertently acknowledge her initial 
at-will status, she did so with the understanding that 
Riverview's at-will policy included the constraint that she not 
be terminated without being informed of performance problems and 
being given a chance to improve her performance. (Power Depo., 
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p. 67, R. at 328.) In any event, the facts about the 
Acknowledgement of Receipt for the handbook are in dispute and 
for purposes of summary judgment they must be construed in 
Power's favor. 
C. Conduct Of The Parties: 
The conduct of Riverview executives, including Power's 
immediate superior, Paul Baird, are also acceptable sources of 
evidence to determine intent. Berube 771 P.2d at 1044; Gilmore 
775 P.2d at 942. In Johnson v. Morton Thiokol. Inc., 818 P.2d 
997 (Utah 1991), Justice Stewart explains how contract law 
principals apply to determine the weight to be given to conduct 
of the parties in interpreting implied-in-fact contract terms. 
Contract terms implied from the conduct of 
the parties ordinarily stand on equal footing 
with express contract terms. Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts §§4, 19 (1981) . . . . 
The actual conduct of the parties may modify 
an express statement in an employment manual 
that employment is only on an at-will basis, 
just as any contract term may be modified by 
the conduct of the parties. 
(Stewart, J. concurring in the result). 
The conduct of Paul Baird is evidence of the company 
policy that if performance was lacking, an employee would be 
notified and given the opportunity for correction. As Baird's 
Administrative Assistant, Power observed Baird follow this 
disciplinary procedure for several employees ("probably more than 
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a dozen"). Power knows of no instance when Baird discharged an 
employee without first writing a performance improvement plan for 
the person, and giving the employee an opportunity to improve, 
except when he terminated her. (Power Depo., p. 71, R. at 330.) 
These facts are evidence that an implied-in-fact contract existed 
limiting Riverview's ability to terminate Power at-will. 
POINT IV 
WHETHER THERE WAS A REDUCTION-IN-
FORCE IS A QUESTION OF FACT FOR THE JURY 
Judge Young concluded, on the weight of Riverview's 
claim, that Power's termination was a Reduction in Force and "the 
plaintiff was let go for that reason alone." (R. at 984.) There 
is no record support for this, other than the unsupported 
characterization of the termination as a RIF by Paul Baird and by 
Riverview's personnel officer, Cindy Reisner. To the contrary, 
the pretext of the RIF claim is shown in Paul Baird7s own 
deposition where he testified that Power was terminated for poor 
work performance. (Baird Depo., pp. 70-71 and 85, R. at 346-47 
and 349; Performance Evaluation Form 4th Qtr. x89, R. at 359.) 
If there was a true RIF, Power's performance would have 
been irrelevant. And, if Paul Baird was only just cutting staff 
in his department, Power had valid claim to the management 
position in the mail order facility which she had been promised. 
If performance concerns were legitimate, Power was entitled to 
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notice of deficiencies, instruction on expectations, and an 
opportunity to perform — that was Debbi and Randy Fields' 
promise to Power! Power got neither the anticipated transfer or 
the company's promised fairness. Riverview cannot have it both 
ways. 
Based on Baird's statements that Power was terminated 
for poor performance, a jury should conclude that there was, in 
fact, no reduction in force. Coelho v. Posi-Seal Int'l., 544 
A.2d 170, 178, (Conn. Sup. Ct. 1988). The RIF allegation is a 
pretext to cover up Riverview's failure to follow its 
disciplinary procedure by terminating Power without any warning 
or opportunity to correct job performance. It begs the question 
to claim that Power's job position was eliminated because of poor 
performance, but that Power was not entitled to Riverview's 
contractual due process because the termination was a reduction-
in-force, rather than "for cause." 
Even if the termination could be characterized as a 
RIF, it is not necessarily "just cause," as a matter of law. 
Harlan v. Sohio Petroleum C., 677 F. Supp. 1021, 1030 (N.D. Cal. 
1988). It is a matter for the trier-of-fact to determine whether 
an employee has been terminated as a result of a legitimate RIF 
or because of other factors. Flaniaan v. Prudential Federal 
Savings & Loan Assoc., 720 P.2d 257, 261 (Mont. 1986). An 
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employer's contention that some employees were terminated as a 
result of a legitimate RIF does not necessarily establish that 
all employees were discharged for the same reason. An employer 
may not use a RIF as a pretext to terminate other employees in 
violation of contractual obligations. Coelho 544 A.2d at 178; 
see also Linn v. Beneficial Commercial Corp., 543 A.2d 954, 956 
(N.J. Super. A.D. 1988) (elimination of job must be due to 
legitimate, economic or business reasons and not as a bad faith 
pretext to arbitrarily terminate an employee). 
Riverview did not produce any documents in response to 
Power's discovery directed at this very point. On the contrary, 
Riverview's Director of Human Resources claimed that changes in 
the number of personnel at Riverview were primarily the result of 
attrition and not as the result of any study. (Daniel Murphy 
Depo., p. 32, R. at 404.) All of the evidence points to a highly 
fluid company structure in which positions were created, shifted, 
changed and eliminated ad hoc. Baird admits that people under 
his direction were reassigned to other positions during the 
period he claims the company wanted to eliminate positions and 
that he made no attempt to reassign Power. (Baird Depo., pp. R. 
at 342-343.) 
In essence, reduction-in-force is an affirmative 
defense to a claim for breach of employment contract. In order 
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to merit summary judgment on that affirmative defense, Riverview 
would have to show that Power was eliminated solely as a result 
of economic circumstances which necessitated laying off otherwise 
satisfactory employees• That situation would truly present "no 
genuine issue as to material fact." Rule 56(c), U. R. Civ. P. 
But where, as here, an employer specifically ties the decision to 
eliminate a position to the performance of the person in that 
position, after having pledged to provide notice, instruction, 
and an opportunity to improve, the reduction in force can no 
longer be a purely economic rational. At that point, company 
standards for training, discipline, and performance retention 
merge with analysis of the employee's specific circumstances. 
The result is a fact-intensive problem which should be entrusted 
to the jury for resolution based on all the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
In the first instance, this case should be remanded 
because Judge Young failed to follow the law of the case 
doctrine. In essence, he second-guessed Judge Homer Wilkinson's 
denial of Motion for Summary Judgment and denial of Motion for 
Reconsideration. In so doing, he also bypassed the determination 
of Judge Frank Noel that Power's evidence of an implied-in-fact 
contract was substantial and relevant, thus justifying denial of 
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Riverview's Motion in Limine to exclude that evidence from trial. 
This appeal can be disposed of completely on this issue, with 
remand for trial on the merits. 
With regard to Judge Young's entry of summary judgment 
against Power, the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of 
Appeals have reaffirmed numerous times that the question of 
whether the at-will presumption has been overcome is a question 
of fact reserved for the jury. It is only when no reasonable 
jury could find "for cause" terms of employment that the court is 
authorized to bypass the constitutional right to jury trial and 
to direct entry of judgment in favor of the employer. In 
conducting its analysis, the trial court must look to the 
employer's conduct and oral representations to determine the 
intent of the parties, and to judge the "circumstances as a 
whole." Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah, Inc., 844 P.2d 331, 334 (Utah 
1992). Judge Young didn't do that. 
Typically, summary judgment motions are defeated (or 
reversed on appeal) by the plaintiff showing one or two material 
facts which support its case. The extensive reference and 
recitation to facts supporting Power's case goes far beyond the 
usual requirement. Even so, it is not exhaustive. Power is 
entitled to present all of her evidence in a comprehensive 
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manner, as previously and correctly authorized by Judge 
Wilkinson. 
Similarly, Riverview's claim to have terminated Power 
through a reduction-in-force is a fact-intensive question on 
which the evidence is in dispute. For both this issue, and the 
primary issue of rebutting the "at-will" presumption, Judge Young 
did not provide Power's evidence with the favorable inferences to 
which they are entitled. Instead, he accepted Riverview's claims 
as per se defenses, almost as if there was any evidence to 
support them, Riverview was entitled to win. This was error. 
Power respectfully asks this Court to set aside Judge 
Young's Memorandum Decision granting Riverview relief from Judge 
Wilkinson's Order denying motion for summary judgment. 
DATED this Q&^ day of January, 1994. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
^^<z*£^^ — 
CBZJSSELL Qj/FERICKS 
NATHAN R. HYDE 
GERALD J. LALLATIN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two (2) true and correct copies 
of the foregoing instrument, having been executed and entered by 
the Court, have been mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on 
this ^ ^_Aday of January, 1994, to the following: 
Randall N. Skanchy, Esq. 
Deno G. Himonas, Esq. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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ADDENDA 
1. Memorandum Decision - March 18, 1993 — Record at 980-984. 
2. Judge Noel Minute Entry on Motion in Limine - November 12, 
1992 — Record at 709. 
3. Transcript of March 18, 1993 hearing on Motion for Relief — 
Record at 1091-1132. 
4. Order on Defendants Relief from Order — Record at 986-988. 
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MAR 18 1993 
OqwtyCbft 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARIAMERCEDES POWER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RIVERVIEW FINANCIAL CORP. 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM 
DECISION 
CASE # 10741 
The above matter came on for argument on the defendant's "Motion for Relief from 
Order." The Plaintiff was represented by Russell c. Fericks and Nathan R. Hyde. The 
Defendant was represented by Randall N. Skanchy and Deno G. Himonas. The court heard 
the argument of counsel, reviewed the pleadings on file and now renders this it's 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
This action arises out of the alleged termination of the employment of the plaintiff by the 
defendant. Discovery has been concluded and the information relating to the parties 
employment relationship has been developed and is essentially undisputed for the purposes of 
this decision. 
The plaintiff prepared and submitted an employment application December 1, 1988. She 
was hired and worked for approximately thirteen (13) months. When seeking employment 
she completed the application which stated as follows: 
We are an equal opportunity employer dedicated to a policy of non-
discrimination in employment on any basis including race, creed, color, age, 
sex, religion, or national origin. All employees of the Company are at-will 
employees subject to termination at any time with or without cause, (emphasis 
added) 
0009SU 
Later, on June 20, 1989 while employed and after some initial indoctrination as to the 
company's policies and procedures, the plaintiff was given an Employee's Handbook which 
contained additional and lengthy instructions as to the company's expectations and the 
employee's expectations. In the "Acknowledgement of Receipt" signed by the plaintiff is this 
language in standard size and consistently obvious location: 
I understand that neither this Handbook nor any other representation by a 
management official of The Company are intended to create a contract of 
employment. I understand that The Company and I have the same right to end 
my employment at any time for any reason, (emphasis added) 
In addition, in the Employee's Handbook states, "Every employee is free to terminate his 
or her employment at any time, with or without cause." 
It is clear from the foregoing that the company and the employee intended to and did 
create an "at-will" employment relationship. 
Thereafter, Ms. Power was terminated as a result of a "reduction in force." She has 
sued claiming that the employment relationship had been modified from "at-will" to an 
"implied-in-fact" employment. 
The court inquired of counsel as to what facts occurred to render the change. The 
defendant, naturally, said the relationship remained "at will." The plaintiff said that the 
relationship had changed due to the following alleged facts: 1. The company had engaged 
in a course of conduct that indicated it felt otherwise than an "at will" relationship. This 
course included a lengthy video tape in which the principals stated among other things that 
[2] 
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they would be fair in dealing with employee mistakes and errors etc. 2. The plaintiff had 
been promised a "new position," if she continued to work out. 3. The plaintiff was 
promised consideration for a future job with a mail order facility. 4. The plaintiff was 
given positive job reports and was even used to train other new employees. 5. The plaintiff, 
when terminated, had not been previously warned of impending termination or deficient work 
performance but was told only that there was a reduction in force. Assuming each of the 
above to be true, the company could still reduce it's force and release the plaintiff "at will." 
None of the above give the plaintiff a basis to conclude that her employment had been 
modified from "at will." 
The plaintiff feels that the issue now before the court had twice been considered by 
Judges Wilkinson and Noel when previously assigned to Summit County. There is some 
dispute on that since the defendant indicates that Judge Noel only considered matters in 
Limine and not the matter of Summary Judgment and Judge Wilkinson did not have the 
benefit of recent decisions of the Supreme Court. (Sanderson v. First Security Leasing 
Company 201 Ut Adv Rep 18 [Dec. 1992] and Hodgson v. Bunzi Utah, Inc., 202 Ut Adv 
Rep 22 [Dec. 1992]) 
This court recognizes the undesirable nature of the master calendar system now followed 
in Summit County were the Judge will change as the assignment changes. However, it is 
incumbent on the Judge assigned to do the best he or she can in dealing with a case to see 
that the matter is handled consistent with the Judge's best judgment under the circumstances. 
[3] 
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With that in mind, it is my opinion that the Motion for Relief from Order should be and the 
same is hereby granted. 
Considering the above cases, the undersigned feels that had the cases been available to 
Judge Wilkinson, his decision would have been otherwise. I submit my reasoning as follow: 
While this court recognizes, as stated by Justice Zimmerman in Sanderson, that: 
the existence of an implied-in-fact contract is a factual question committed 
to the sound discretion of the jury. (p. 19) 
the question must be buttressed by some clear action to deviate from the "at-will" 
relationship. In Sanderson it was the promise to allow Mr. Sanderson, while ill, to "take all 
the time...needed, (and) do what needed to (be) done" to recover. Thus the "at-will" 
employment was changed to allow Mr. Sanderson to remain off work while recovering and 
further to allow him to retain the confidence that he would not be fired for doing so. The 
subsequent question of fact at trial was whether Mr. Sanderson had been terminated for 
absence or some for some other reason. 
In the Hodgson case, Justice Howe stated the issue to be whether the defendant had 
"modified" the "at-will employment status" to this plaintiff by "issuing warnings to four 
(other) employees" prior to termination. The court then stated: 
In order for conduct and oral statements to establish an implied-in-fact 
contract, such evidence must be strong enough to overcome the presumption of 
at-will employment and any inconsistent written policies and disclaimers. 
In the instant case, the court finds that reasonable minds cannot differ as to the fact that 
[4] 
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the evidence was not strong enough to overcome the presumption that an "at will" 
relationship continued and that the company had done nothing to change the "at-will" 
relationship with this plaintiff. All assurances remained consistent with the "at-will" status 
and when it became necessary to reduce employees, the plaintiff was let go for that reason 
alone. 
The court grants the defendant's motion for Summary Judgment finding that the plaintiff 
was an "at-will" employee and the alleged "facts" claimed by the plaintiff are insufficient as 
a matter of law to allow the matter to go to the jury for consideration. 
Mr. Himonas is requested to prepare Findings and a Judgment consistent herewith and 
with the record as plead and argued. 
(Following the preparation of the foregoing, the plaintiffs counsel submitted a "Supplemental 
Brief to Hearing on Defendant's Motion for Relief from Order." The court has reviewed the 
pleading with the accompanying cases and finds that the record fails to reveal sufficient 
information for the court to conclude that the plaintiff could have "justifiably" relied on 
additional expressed or implied policies being applicable to her employment. The fact that 
employees may have been dealt with on disciplinary matters in a different way does not 
change the fact that the plaintiffs position was illiminated due to a reduction in force.) 
[5] 
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1 P . B . O C E E _ D ^ N G ^ 
2 JUDGE YOUNG: THIS IS THE TIME SET TO CONSIDER 
3 ORAL ARGUMENT ON THE MATTER OF MAR IAMERCEDES POWER VERSUS 
4 RIVERVIEW FINANCIAL CORPORATION. 
5 THIS IS THE MOTION OF THE DEFENDANT FOR THE COURT 
6 TO CONSIDER THE ISSUE OF RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER 
7 THAT DEALS WITH THE I MPL I ED-1 N-FACT PORTION OF THE LITIGATIONi 
8 THAT'S REMAINING PENDING. 
9 MR. HIMONAS? 
10 MR. HIMONAS: THAT'S CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. 
11 JUDGE YOUNG: WOULD EACH OF YOU STATE YOUR 
12 APPEARANCES FOR THE RECORD, PLEASE? 
13 MR. HIMONAS: DENO HIMONAS WITH RANDY SKANCHY 
14 ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT, RIVERVIEW FINANCIAL CORPORATION. 
15 MR. HYDE: YOUR HONOR, NATHAN HYDE AND RUSSELL 
16 FERRICKS ON BEHALF OF MAR IAMERCEDES POWER. 
17 JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU. IT IS YOUR MOTION, 
18 MR. HIMONAS. YOU MAY PROCEED. I WILL INDICATE TO YOU THAT 
19 I'VE READ YOUR MATERIALS. AND THE RECORD SHOULD ALSO SHOW, 
20 THAT AS WE ALL KNOW, THAT THIS IS A SUMMIT COUNTY CASE. 
21 I'M CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO SUMMIT COUNTY. THE FILE IS IN 
22 SUMMIT COUNTY SO THE MATTER IS BEING HEARD HERE FOR ARGU-
23 MENT AND THE ORDERS AND OTHER MATTERS WILL BE SUBMITTED 
24 TO SUBMIT COUNTY. 
25 MR. HIMONAS: I WILL BE BRIEF, YOUR HONOR. 
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1 JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. 
2 MR. HIMONAS: MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT. THE SOLE 
3 ISSUE BEFORE YOU TODAY IS WHETHER JUDGE WILKINSON'S PRIOR 
4 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF'S 
5 IMPLIED-IN-FACT EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT CLAIM SHOULD BE VACATED 
6 IN LIGHT OF SOME RECENT DECISIONS BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT. 
7 THE ANSWER FROM DEFENDANT, OF COURSE, IS AN EMPHATIC YES. 
8 I THINK THE GUIDING LIGHT IS HODGSON V. BUNZL UTAH, INC.. 
9 THE SUPREME COURTS MOST RECENT PRONOUNCEMENT IN THE AREA 
10 WAS RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN LATE JANUARY OF THIS YEAR, 
11 YOUR HONOR. I'D LIKE TO TAKE A BRIEF MOMENT AND DISCUSS 
12 HODGSON. 
13 THE PLAINTIFF ARGUED THAT THE AT-WILL PRESUMPTION 
14 HAD BEEN OVERCOME BY AN ORAL STATEMENT, OF DEFENDANT'S 
15 DISTRICT MANAGER, QUOTE, "THAT THE COMPANY FOLLOWED DISCI-
16 PLINARY PROCEDURES TO GIVE EMPLOYEES A CHANCE TO CORRECT 
17 DEFICIENCIES." PLAINTIFF ALSO ARGUED THAT THE COMPANY 
18 FOLLOWED SUCH DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES WITH RESPECT TO FOUR 
19 OTHER EMPLOYEES DURING THE TIME OF HER EMPLOYMENT AND, AGAINJ, 
20 THIS OVERCAME THE AT-WILL PRESUMPTION. 
21 THE COURT SHOULD ALSO NOTE IN THAT CASE THE 
22 PLAINTIFF WAS GIVEN A DOCUMENT OUTLINING THE DISCIPLINARY 
23 POLICIES AS WELL. 
24 THE TRIAL COURT DISAGREED WITH THE PLAINTIFF'S 
25 ANALYSIS AND GRANTED THE EMPLOYER SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ON 
APPEAL THE SUPREME COURT DEFERRED. IN REACHING ITS CONCLU-
SION, YOUR HONOR, THE SUPREME COURT REALLY RELIED UPON TWO 
FACTS. ONE, THE PLAINTIFF WAS INFORMED AT ABOUT THE TIME 
HER EMPLOYMENT BEGAN WITH THE COMPANY THAT IT WAS AN AT-WILL 
COMPANY AND, TWO, THE EXISTENCE OF CLEAR DISCLAIMERS IN 
THE EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK WHICH WAS PREPARED AND DISSEMINATED 
TO THE EMPLOYEES AFTER THE EMPLOYMENT, PLAINTIFF'S PREEMPLOY-
MENT BEGAN, AND THOSE DISCLAIMERS STATED EMPLOYMENT WAS 
AT-WILL AND STATEMENTS TO THE CONTRARY BY COMPANY OFFICIALS 
SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED IN GIVING RISE TO AN EMPLOYMENT 
CONTRACT. 
HERE, YOUR HONOR, THE FACTS ARE VERY CLOSE TO 
THOSE IN BUNZL. THE PLAINTIFF ESSENTIALLY ARGUES THAT THE 
AT-WILL PRESUMPTION HAS BEEN OVERCOME BASED UPON, PRIMARILY 
UPON AN ORAL REPRESENTATION MADE BY RANDY FIELDS IN THE 
TRAINING VIDEO, "WHAT WE STAND FOR," TO THE EFFECT THE 
COMPANY FOLLOWS A GRIEVANCE OR DISCIPLINARY PROCESS. THE 
UNDISPUTED FACTS IN THIS CASE, HOWEVER, ALSO INCLUDE THE 
FOLLOWING. (1), AT THE TIME SHE COMMENCED WORKING FOR THE 
DEFENDANT THE PLAINTIFF WAS INFORMED IN WRITING THAT "ALL 
EMPLOYEES," AND I QUOTE, "OF THE COMPANY ARE AT-WILL 
EMPLOYEES SUBJECT TO TERMINATION AT ANY TIME WITH OR WITHOUT 
CAUSE"; (2), THE COMPANY DISSEMINATED A HANDBOOK THAT CON-
TAINED A SERIES OF EXPLICIT DISCLAIMERS, YOUR HONOR. 
FOR EXAMPLE, ONE SUCH DISCLAIMER GOES AS FOLLOWS. 
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"THE COMPANY IS AN 'AT-WILL' EMPLOYER WHICH MEANS THAT ANY 
AND ALL TEAM MEMBERS ARE SUBJECT TO TERMINATION AT ANY TIME 
WITH OR WITHOUT CAUSE" AND, (3), PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANTLY, 
THE PLAINTIFFS SIGNED AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT EXPRESSLY NOTING 
THE FOLLOWING, "THE COMPANY RESERVES THE RIGHT TO TRANSFER, 
PROMOTE, DEMOTE, OR TERMINATE ME WITH OR WITHOUT CAUSE AT 
ANY TIME." 
AND "I UNDERSTAND THAT NEITHER THIS HANDBOOK 
NOR ANY OTHER REPRESENTATION BY A MANAGEMENT OFFICIAL OF 
THE COMPANY ARE INTENDED TO C^-ATE A CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT. 
I UNDERSTAND THAT THE COMPANY AND I HAVE THE SAME RIGHT 
TO END MY EMPLOYMENT AT ANY TIME AND FOR ANY REASON." 
IN LIGHT OF THESE FACTS, AND THEIR STRIKING 
SIMILARITY TO THE FACTS, THAT ARE PRESENTED IN BUNZL, IN 
PARTICULAR, SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS CLEARLY NOT WARRANTED, YOUR 
HONOR; CONSEQUENTLY WE ASK YOU TO VACATE JUDGE WILKINSON'S 
PRIOR ORDER DENYING A SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE IMPLIED-IN-
FACT CONTRACT CLAIM AND HELPING US AVOID THE COSTS THAT 
ARE ATTENDANT TO A FOUR-DAY JURY TRIAL SCHEDULED IN THIS 
MATTER TO TAKE PLACE NEXT MONTH. THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU, MR. HIMONAS. 
MR. HYDE? 
MR. HYDE: YOUR HONOR, IN ORDER TO PREVAIL ON 
THEIR MOTION DEFENDANTS MUST MEET A PARTICULARLY HIGH 
STANDARD TO OBTAIN RELIEF FROM A SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER. 
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SUCH RELIEF MUST BE INVOKED ONLY IN UNUSUAL AND EXCEPTIONAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES. SUCH RELIEF IS TO BE USED CAUTIOUSLY AND 
SPARINGLY AND PLAINTIFF'S SUBMIT THIS IS NOT AN UNUSUAL 
OR EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCE. THERE IS NOTHING EXCEPTIONAL 
OR UNUSUAL ABOUT THESE TWO NEW CASES IN THIS AREA OF THE 
LAW. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION AND MEMO IN SUPPORT INITIALLY 
SAID THAT THAT CLARIFIES THIS AREA OF THE LAW AND LATER, 
I THINK OUR MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION ILLUSTRATES THAT IS 
NOT THE CASE, THAT THE LAW STATED IN THESE TWO CASES IS 
JUST REITERATING SEVERAL OTHER CASES THAT LED UP TO THESE 
MOST RECENT CASES. 
AND IN ITS REPLY, PLAINTIFF THEN, OR DEFENDANT 
THEN STATES, WELL, IT'S REALLY THE FACTUAL NATURE OF THESE 
CASES THAT'S SO UNIQUE. WELL, WE SUBMIT THAT IN PARTICULAR 
THE CASE OF JOHNSON V. MORTON THIOKOL IS VERY CLOSE TO THESE 
CASES AND, IN FACT, THE SCENARIO THAT DEFENDANT IN THIS 
CASE ARGUES IS SO UNIQUE AND SHOULD BE APPLIED TO OUR CASE 
IT'S REALLY JUST A REITERATION OF THE SAME PRINCIPALS. 
JUDGE YOUNG: LET ME SEE IF I CAN UNDERSTAND, 
MR. HYDE, YOUR POSITION. ISN'T IT TRUE THAT WHEN SOMEONE 
IS EMPLOYED IN AN AT-WILL POSITION, WHICH THE COMPANY CLEARLV 
STATED AND CLEARLY DID IN THEIR EMPLOYMENT OF MS. POWER, 
IT WAS CLEAR THAT IT WAS AT-WILL, THEN THE QUESTION OF FACT-
ARE YOU DISPUTING EVEN WHETHER THE EMPLOYMENT WAS AT-WILL? 
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MR. HYDE: ABSOLUTELY, YOUR HONOR. WE'RE SAYING 
THAT THEIR MANUAL HAS AT-WILL TERMS IN IT BUT THE MANUAL 
ALSO--BUT THEY ARE NEGATED BY OTHER INHERENT TERMS AND 
PROMISES MADE IN THAT VERY SAME MANUAL. 
JUDGE YOUNG: WHAT THEN WOULD THE LANGUAGE MEAN 
WHERE SHE ACKNOWLEDGES IN HER OWN DISCLAIMER THAT SHE 
ACKNOWLEDGES SHE'S AT-WILL? 
MR. HYDE: WELL, THAT'S ABSOLUTELY CORRECT. 
AT THAT TIME WHEN SHE FIRST MAY BE HIRED ON SHE MAY HAVE 
AGREED THAT THAT MAY HAVE BEEN HER SITUATION. WE STATE, 
FIRST OF ALL, THAT IT WASN'T EXPLAINED WHAT AT-WILL IS. 
IT IS SURPRISING HOW MANY EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES IN THIS 
STATE HAVE NO IDEA WHAT THAT CONCEPT IS WITHOUT IT BEING 
EXPLAINED TO THEM. AND THEN SHE COULD RELY ON THE MANUAL 
FOR AN EXPLANATION AS TO WHAT THAT IS. AND IT'S INHERENTLY 
AMBIGUOUS IN THE MANUAL. 
SECOND, EVEN IF THE CASES ARE CLEAR ON THIS IN 
UTAH, THAT IF, EVEN IF YOU HAVE AT-WILL AT THE OUTSET, THERE 
ARE SEVERAL THINGS THAT CAN CHANGE THE NATURE OF THAT EMPLOY-
MENT CONTRACT. ONE IS ORAL ASSURANCES, COURSE OF CONDUCT 
AND OTHER WRITTEN OR OTHER REPRESENTATIONS BY THE EMPLOYER. 
AND THAT'S WHAT WE ASSERT HAS HAPPENED HERE. AND THAT'S 
WHAT JUDGE NOEL AND JUDGE WILKINSON HAVE DETERMINED, THAT 
IS SUBSEQUENT TO THIS AT-WILL LANGUAGE. THEY'VE ALL SEEN 
THIS AT-WILL LANGUAGE, AND KNOWLEDGE OF THAT IS IN THE 
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DOCUMENTS, BUT AS TO WHAT THE AT-WILL MEANING HAS TO MRS. 
POWER IS AT ISSUE AND IS A QUESTION OF FACT AS STATED--
JUDGE YOUNG: WELL, I KNOW JUSTICE ZIMMERMAN 
SAID THAT THE EXISTENCE OF AN IMPLI ED-IN-FACT CONTRACT IS 
A FACTUAL QUESTION THAT IS SUBJECT TO SOUND DISCRETION OF 
THE JURY. SO THIS IS--I AM SENSITIVE, PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE 
TO THE IDEA THAT THIS CASE NOW, EVEN POTENTIALLY THE LAW 
OF THE CASE IS SUCH THAT THE COURT NEEDS TO ALLOW THIS TO 
GO TO THE JURY, BUT I THINK I NEED TO ALLOW THIS TO GO TO 
THE JURY ONLY IF I CAN CONCLUDE THAT REASONABLE MINDS COULD 
NOT DIFFER. 
MR. HYDE: THAT'S TRUE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: IN OTHER WORDS, IF I FIND THAT 
REASONABLE MINDS COULD NOT DIFFER, THAT THIS WAS AN AT-WILL 
EMPLOYMENT, THEN I'M OBLIGATED FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL CON-
CERNED TO GRANT THE MOTION--TO GRANT THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
NOW IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IF THE COMPANY SAYS AT 
THE OUTSET IN THEIR MANUAL THAT THIS IS AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT 
AND IF THE COMPANY THEN PUTS IN THEIR HANDBOOK THAT THIS 
IS AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT, AND THEN IF THE INDIVIDUAL SIGNING 
ON SAYS THIS IS AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT, THEN THE INDIVIDUAL 
THEMSELVES MUST MAKE SOME DIFFERENT FACTUAL ALLEGATION THAT 
CHANGES THIS FROM AT-WILL TO SOME HIGHER AND MORE PROTECTED 
EMPLOYMENT. 
MR. HYDE: THAT'S ABSOLUTELY THE CASE. 
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1 JUDGE YOUNG: OKAY. NOW, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT 
2 THERE IS--DID JUDGES NOEL AND WILKINSON REVIEW--YOU ARE 
3 RELYING ON THE VIDEOTAPE THAT RANDY FIELDS SAID IS A BASIS 
4 FOR HIS COUNSELING THE AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT. 
5 MR. HYDE: AMONG OTHER THINGS, YES. 
6 JUDGE YOUNG: WELL, TELL ME WHAT IN THE RECORD--
7 I ASSUME THERE'S NO DISPUTE FACTUALLY--WHAT IN THE RECORD 
8 DO YOU RELY ON TO DETERMINE THAT THE AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT 
9 WAS CANCELLED? 
10 AND LET ME TELL YOU THE OTHER PROBLEM I WOULD 
11 LIKE YOU TO ADDRESS YOURSELF TO. I HAVE A PROBLEM IN MY 
12 OWN MIND DETERMINING THAT AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT CAN BE CANCELLED; 
13 FOR ALL ON THE BASIS OF A GENERAL COMPANY'S STATEMENT. 
14 IT LOOKED TO ME LIKE IN READING THE CASE IF AT-WILL EMPLOY-
15 MENT IS GOING TO BE CHANGED, FOR INSTANCE, THE SANDERSON 
16 V. FIRST SECURITY LEASING CASE, WHERE I THINK IT WAS SANDER-
17 SON--AM I RIGHT ON THE NAME? 
18 MR. HYDE: YEAH, RIGHT. 
19 JUDGE YOUNG: --WHERE SANDERSON IS ILL AND HAVING 
20 A MENTAL AND PHYSICAL BREAKDOWN AND THEY SAY THAT YOU TAKE 
21 WHATEVER TIME IS NECESSARY--
22 MR. HYDE: YOUR JOB WILL BE HERE. 
23 JUDGE YOUNG: THAT IS A PERSONAL ASSURANCE HE 
24 WILL NOT BE FIRED FOR THE CONDITION ASSOCIATED WITH HIS 
25 ILLNESS, BUT HE WAS FIRED FOR FAILURE TO PERFORM PROPERLY. 
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NOW, IN THIS CASE, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, MS. POWER 
WAS FIRED FOR REDUCTION IN PERSONNEL. THEY JUST HAD A 
REDUCTION. 
MR. HYDE: WELL, THE DEFENDANTS HAVE SAID TWO 
OR THREE REASONS. SHE WAS NEVER TOLD THAT AND THAT'S PART 
OF THE RECORD. THERE'S A DISPUTE AS TO WHAT REALLY THE 
TRUE REASON AND FACT WAS. WE CLAIM THAT'S A PRETEXT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: I SEE. 
MR. HYDE: THAT'S AN EASY OUT FOR AN EMPLOYER 
TO SAY RATHER THAN DEALING WITH THE ISSUE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: WELL, TELL ME WHAT YOU THINK THE 
COMPANY DID TO, OR FOR MS. POWER-
MR. HYDE: OKAY. 
JUDGE YOUNG: --TO CANCEL THE AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT. 
MR. HYDE: AS THE CASE LAW SUGGESTS, EVIDENCE 
OF THE IMPLIED CONTRACT TERMS COMES IN MANY FORMS, INCLUDING 
COURSE OF CONDUCT, ORAL ASSURANCES AND OTHER REPRESENTATIONS] 
WHETHER THEY BE WRITTEN OR ORAL. IN THE MANUAL ITSELF--
LET ME BACK UP TO SAY, THE FIELDS, IN THIS VIDEOTAPE, HAVE 
THIS OVERRIDING PR INCI PAL--IN FACT, I'VE GOT A COPY IF YOU'D 
LIKE THE TRANSCRIPT. IT'S PROBABLY PART OF THE RECORD. 
JUDGE YOUNG: YES, THANK YOU. 
MR. HYDE: AND I CAN READ FROM EXCERPTS FROM 
THAT IF IT WOULD HELP THE COURT, BUT GENERALLY, THE FIELDS 
SAY, WHAT WE SAY ISN'T WHAT COMPANIES NORMALLY SAY. WE 
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1 USE WORDS AND THEY MEAN DIFFERENT THINGS TO US. 
2 FIRST OF ALL, ON PAGE 3, THE FIRST FULL PARAGRAPH 
3 IT SAYS, "MANY ORGANIZATIONS HAVE PROCEDURES MANUALS AND 
4 PERSONNEL MANUALS AND OPERATIONS MANUALS AND THAT SORT OF 
5 THING, EIGHT TO TEN FEET HIGH, SO THAT NO MATTER WHAT DECI-
6 SION YOU HAVE TO MAKE, YOU HAVE TO GO CONSULT SOME MANUAL." 
7 | WELL--AND THEN THEY SAY, "WHAT HAS CHANGED ARE 
8 ALMOST EVERY PROCEDURE IN THE COMPANY. EVERY ONE OF OUR 
9 PROCEDURES CHANGES, BUT THE WHY OF IT NEVER DOES, AND I 
10 THINK YOU'LL UNDERSTAND IT BETTER THIS MORNING." 
11 AND WHAT THEY DO IN THIS TRAINING SESSION THIS 
12 TRANSCRIPT IS ABOUT, IS THAT THEY SET FORTH THE COMPANY 
13 VALUES AS THE BE ALL AND END ALL OF THIS COMPANY AND HOW 
14 YOU OPERATE AND CONDUCT YORUSELF AS AN EMPLOYEE IN THE 
15 COMPANY. VALUE NO. 4 IS FAIR TREATMENT OF ALL. 
16 JUDGE YOUNG: WHERE IS THAT? 
17 MR. HYDE: AND THAT'S ONE PAGE 13. TOWARDS THE 
18 BOTTOM. 
19 JUDGE YOUNG: OKAY. 
20 MR. HYDE: THE SECOND TO THE LAST PARAGRAPH. 
21 RIGHT BEFORE RANDY TAKES OVER DEBBIE SAYS, "FAIR TREATMENT 
22 OF ALL. THIS IS PART OF OUR FOUNDATION. PART OF OUR 
23 EXPECTATION." AND RANDY SAYS, "YEAH, LET ME DEAL WITH WHAT 
24 FAIR TREATMENT MEANS BECAUSE IT MEANS SOMETHING DIFFERENT 
25 THAN YOU MIGHT MEAN IN A CONVENTIONAL SENSE IN ANOTHER 
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1 COMPANY." 
2 AND ONTO THE NEXT PAGE, A COUPLE INCHES DOWN, 
3 RANDY SAYS, "LET ME GIVE YOU AN EXAMPLE OF WHAT'S NOT FAIR. 
4
 LET'S SUPPOSE YOU HAVE SOMEBODY THAT'S NOT A GOOD PERFORMER 
5 THEY'RE NOT VERY GOOD ON THE COUNTER. THEY DON'T TREAT 
6 CUSTOMERS PROPERLY. LET ME TELL YOU WHAT'S NOT FAIR. HERE'i 
7 WHAT'S NOT FAIR. NOT SAYING ANYTHING TO THEM AND SCHEDULING 
8 THEM OUT OF THE COMPANY. OH, I'M SORRY, I DON'T HAVE ENOUGH 
9 HOURS FOR YOU THIS WEEK. THAT'S NOT FAIR. LET ME TELL 
10 YOU WHAT ELSE IS NOT FAIR. WITHOUT WARNING, YOU WALK IN 
11 I FOR SOME RELATIVELY MINOR INFRACTION OF THE RULES AND FIRING 
12 THEM. THEY NEVER KNEW THAT THEY WERE DOING SOMETHING WRONG, 
13 THEY HAD NO COMMUNICATION ON THE TOPIC WHATSOEVER. THAT'S 
14 NOT FAIR. WOULD YOU LIKE TO BE TREATED THAT WAY? ABSOLUTELY 
15 NOT." 
16 AND PUBLISHING THIS VIDEOTAPE AND DISSEMINATING 
17 IT TO EMPLOYEES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD REALLY ENHANCES WHAT 
'8 is BEING SAID. THESE ARE THE FOUNDERS AND CHIEF OFFICERS 
19 OF THIS COMPANY. 
20 JUDGE YOUNG: OKAY. BUT IF THEY COME IN TO MS. 
21 POWER AND SAY, MS. POWER, WE'RE GOING TO TERMINATE YOU 
22 BECAUSE WE'RE HAVING A REDUCTION IN FORCE, WE'VE HAD A 
23 FINANCIAL REVERSAL AND WE ARE REDUCING THIS, THEN THAT'S 
24 | EXPLAINING TO HER THE REASON, ISN'T IT? SHOULD SHE HAVE 
A DIFFERENT STANDARD THAN THAT FOR TERMINATION? 
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MR. HYDE: WELL, NO, IF THAT IS TRULY THE CASE. 
BUT OUR ARGUMENT IS THAT IS A MERE PRETEXT THAT SHE WAS 
NOT TOLD THAT FACT. THAT THAT DID NOT OCCUR. BUT NOW, 
AFTER THE FACT, THAT IS WHAT THE COMPANY IS SAYING HAPPENED. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THEY'VE TAKEN HER DZPOSITION, I 
ASSUME. 
MR. HYDE: YES. 
JUDGE YOUNG: WHAT DOES SHE CLAIM SHE UNDERSTOOD 
FACTUALLY TO BE, ONE, THE REASON FOR HER TERMINATION AND, 
TWO, WHAT SHE UNDERSTOOD TO BE THE CHANGE IN THE COMPANY 
POLICY FROM AN AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT TO PUT HER IN A HIGHER 
STANDARD? 
MR. HYDE: WELL, THIS GENERAL OVERALL POINT THAT 
SHE WILL BE TREATED FAIRLY. THE INCIDENT WAS OVER A DOCUMENT! 
THAT WAS MISPLACED, ALLEGEDLY, THAT WE HAVEN'T BEEN ABLE 
TO COME UP WITH THIS DOCUMENT THAT WAS ALLEGEDLY MISPLACED, 
BUT THEN THERE WAS HER SUPERVISOR HAD JUST GIVEN HER A GREAT 
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND THEN THIS ONE INCIDENT OCCURRED 
AND THAT WAS THE BASIS FOR HER TERMINATION. 
JUST PRIOR TO THAT TIME SHE WAS HAVING DISCUSSIONS) 
OF BEING PROMOTED TO A SUPERVISORY POSITION IN ANOTHER AREA 
OF THE COMPANY, BUT ALMOST AS A KNEE JERK REACTION, BECAUSE 
A DOCUMENT COULDN'T BE FOUND ON ONE OCCASION, THAT WAS THE 
BASIS FOR HER TERMINATION. THERE'S NO INDICATION THAT 
THERE'S ANY OTHER, THERE WERE ANY OTHER REDUCTIONS IN THIS 
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1 DEPARTMENT AT THE TIME, THERE HASN'T BEEN ANY EVIDENCE TO 
2 SUPPORT THE REDUCTION OF FORCE. 
3 JUDGE YOUNG: WELL, AS I UNDERSTAND THE EVIDENCE 
4 I IT IS THAT SHE WAS AN ASSISTANT TO ONE OF THE REGIONAL 
5 ADMINISTRATORS OR DIRECTORS AND THAT THAT POSITION HAS NOT 
6 BEEN REPLACED. 
7 MR. HYDE: WELL, THE THINGS ARE MOVED AROUND 
8 SO OFTEN IT'S HARD TO MEASURE WHETHER OR NOT THAT, IN FACT, 
9 IS THE CASE. I MEAN, SHE WAS BEING REQUESTED BY OTHER PEOPLE! 
10 IN THAT FIRM TO BE A PART OF THEIR TEAM, TO COME WORK WITH 
11 THEM AT THE SAME TIME, SO THERE'S CONFLICTING EVIDENCE ON 
12 THAT FACT. 
13 JUDGE YOUNG: SO HER POSITION IS I WAS FIRED 
14 BECAUSE THEY COULD NOT FIND A DOCUMENT THAT WAS IN MY CHARGE 
15 AND NOT BECAUSE THERE WAS A REDUCTION IN FORCE. 
16 MR. HYDE: THAT IS RIGHT. 
17 JUDGE YOUNG: AND THAT IS THE QUESTION OF FACT. 
18 MR. HYDE: THAT'S CORRECT. THAT'S CORRECT. 
19 AND THE NATURE OF THIS RELATIONSHIP BY THIS VIDEOTAPE--
20 TO GET THE REAL ESSENCE OF IT, YOUR HONOR, I'D ESTIMATE 
21 THAT IT WOULD BE WISE FOR YOU TO REVIEW THE VIDEOTAPE. 
22 I THINK IT IS A PART OF THE FILE IN COALVILLE. IF NOT, 
23 I CAN PROVIDE AN EXAMPLE, BUT THIS IS DRAMATIC STUFF. THIS 
24 IS HEARTFELT PLEADING TO GIVE US YOUR SUPPORT, EMPLOYEES, 
25 AND WE WILL TREAT YOU FAIRLY. IT SAYS YOU CAN HOLD US 
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ABSOLUTELY 100 PERCENT TO THESE STANDARDS. IT'S MORE THAN 
JUST WELL, YOU'RE AT-WILL, WE CAN DO ANYTHING WE WANT. 
IF THEY ARE BARGAINING FOR THE GOOD WILL OF THESE EMPLOYEES 
THEY'RE ERODING THEIR ABILITY TO TERMINATE AT-WILL. AND 
THAT'S A QUESTION OF FACT FOR THE JURY. 
JUDGE YOUNG: SO WHAT YOU'RE SAYING--BUT AS I 
UNDERSTAND YOUR POSITION, YOU'RE SAYING THAT THE STANDARD 
OF EMPLOYMENT FOR MS. POWER WHEN SHE WAS EVEN EMPLOYED WAS 
NOT CONSISTENT WITH AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT. 
MR. HYDE: THAT'S ABSOLUTELY RIGHT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: SO SHE WAS NEVER EMPLOYED AT-WILL. 
MR. HYDE: SHE MAY HAVE BEEN AT THE VERY OUTSET 
BUT AS SHE--AS HER—IT'S NOT REAL SENIORITY, BUT AS HER 
TERM OF EMPLOYMENT CONTINUED OR THINGS HAPPENED WHICH ERODED 
THEIR ABILITY TO TERMINATE HER AT-WILL, INCLUDING STATEMENTS 
BY THE FIELDS THEMSELVES OF WHAT THE NATURE OF THE EMPLOYMENT) 
RELATIONSHIP IS AT MRS. FIELDS AS WELL AS PROMISES OF PROMO-
TION AND PROMISES THAT SHE WOULD BE TREATED FAIRLY AND GIVEN 
A CHANCE, A WARNING AND OPPORTUNITY TO IMPROVE. 
THERE ARE STATEMENTS IN THE MANUAL ITSELF THAT 
BACK UP THIS VIDEOTAPE. THIS VIDEOTAPE IS NOT AN EXCLUSIVE 
STATEMENT OF THESE PRINCIPALS. THE SAME PRINCIPALS ARE 
STATED THROUGHOUT THE EMPLOYMENT MANUAL WHICH IS INCHES 
THICK. 
AND SO THERE ARE SEVERAL THINGS--THE CASE LAW 
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IS THAT YOU LOOK AT THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 
THAT THE AT-WILL DISCLAIMER IN JOHNSON V. MORTON THIOKOL, 
THE REASON THAT EMPLOYER PREVAILED THERE IS BECAUSE THERE 
WASN'T ANYTHING ELSE TO REBUTT THE AT-WILL. THAT'S WHAT 
SANDERSON SAYS. I THINK IT'S INTERESTING NOW THAT SUDDENLY 
SANDERSON DOESN'T HELP THEM WIN, IN THEIR MEMORANDUM IT 
DID, BECAUSE THEY REALIZE THE WEAK STATEMENT THAT YOUR JOB 
WILL BE HERE WHEN YOU GET BACK WAS ENOUGH TO SEND THE MATTER 
TO THE JURY. YOU KNOW, THAT'S A PRETTY ILLUSORY STATEMENT 
ON ITS FACE. THAT SEEMS LIKE TO ENCOURAGE SOMEONE TO GET 
WELL AND WE WILL SEE WHAT'S UP. 
JUDGE YOUNG: WELL, IT SEEMS TO ME THE QUESTION 
OF FACT THAT WAS BEING SENT BACK TO THE JURY WAS WHETHER 
THEY FIRED HIM FOR CAUSE FACTORS RATHER THAN FIRED HIM FOR 
FAILURE TO RETURN TO WORK. AND THAT'S A LEGITIMATE QUESTION 
OF FACT I CAN SEE. I THOUGHT THAT WAS WHAT WAS SENT BACK 
TO THE JURY. 
MR. HYDE: RIGHT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: IT WASN'T SENT BACK TO THE JURY 
TO DETERMINE WHETHER HIS EMPLOYMENT WAS AT-WILL OR OTHERWISE 
MR. HYDE: THAT'S RIGHT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THAT WAS, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, THAT'S; 
A QUESTION OF LAW AND I HAVE TO DECIDE--IF I DECIDE--THE 
WAY I UNDERSTAND YOUR READING OF THESE PARAGRAPHS, FOR 
INSTANCE THE PARAGRAPH, "ALL EMPLOYEES OF THE COMPANY ARE 
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•AT-WILL' EMPLOYEES SUBJECT TO TERMINATION AT ANY TIME WITH 
OR WITHOUT CAUSE/' YOU'RE READING THAT TO NOT BE TRUE. 
YOU HAVE TO READ THAT, UNDER YOUR THEORY TO MEAN-
MR. HYDE: THAT'S RIGHT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: --ALL EMPLOYEES OF THE COMPANY 
ARE-
MR. HYDE: THAT'S RIGHT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: --NOT AT-WILL EMPLOYEES AND MAY 
ONLY BE SUBJECT TO TERMINATION WITH CAUSE. 
MR. HYDE: WELL, WHAT WE SAY IS WHAT THEY SAY. 
WHAT THEY PROMISED THEIR EMPLOYEES IN THIS VIDEOTAPE IS 
THEY WILL TREAT THEM FAIRLY, WHICH MEANS YOU DON'T GO AND 
FIRE THEM FOR SOME RELATIVELY MINOR INFRACTION OF THE RULES. 
JUDGE YOUNG: BUT YOU CAN FIRE THEM FOR REDUCTION 
IN FORCE WITHOUT ANY INQUIRY. 
MR. HYDE: IF THAT IS THE TRUE NATURE OF THE 
TERMINATION, THAT IS CORRECT, BUT YOU CAN'T HIDE BEHIND 
THAT. THE EMPLOYERS CAN'T SAY AT ANY TIME THIS IS A REDUC-
TION IN FORCE, YOU'RE GONE, WHEN, IN FACT, IT ISN'T A TRUE 
REDUCTION IN FORCE. ANYBODY CAN SAY THAT. THAT'S LIKE 
SAYING, YOU KNOW, THIS IS CHARACTERIZING EVERYTHING AS 
INSUBORDINATION AS CAUSE FOR TERMINATION. EMPLOYERS CANNOT 
DO THAT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: SO YOUR POSITION IS THEN THAT THE 
QUESTION OF FACT THAT REMAINS IN THIS CASE IS WHETHER SHE 
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WAS DISCHARGED FOR FAILURE TO FIND A DOCUMENT OR FOR A LOST 
DOCUMENT OR WHETHER SHE WAS TRUTHFULLY DISCHARGED FOR REDUC-
TION IN FORCE AND THAT'S A QUESTION OF FACT. 
MR. HYDE: WELL, EVEN MORE BROADLY--THAT'S TRUE, 
I AGREE WITH THE COURT ON THAT POINT--BUT EVEN MORE BROADLY, 
WHAT THE NATURE OF HER EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT WAS, WHAT WERE 
THE TERMS OF THAT CONTRACT TAKEN FROM PROMISES OF PROMOTION 
THAT SHE WAS GOING TO BE GIVEN OPPORTUNITIES ELSEWHERE, 
PROMISES THAT SHE WOULDN'T BE FIRED FOR A RELATIVELY MINOR 
INFRACTION WITHOUT HAVING SOME COMMUNICATION. IT'S NOT 
ONLY THE ABILITY TO FIRE BUT WHAT HAS TO TAKE PLACE PRIOR 
TO THE TERMINATION IS WHAT IS A QUESTION OF FACT IN THIS 
CASE. AND AGAIN, THE BASIS OF THIS ORDER, OR BASIS OF THIS 
MOTION IS RELIEF FROM AN ORDER THAT JUDGE WILKINSON AND 
JUDGE NOEL HAVE ALREADY RULED UPON. THESE ISSUES HAVE BEEN 
BANTERED BEFORE THIS COURT ON TWO OTHER OCCASIONS AND THERE'S^ 
NOTHING UNUSUAL ABOUT WHAT HAS HAPPENED THROUGH HODGSON 
OR SANDERSON WHICH WOULD EVEN HAVE THE COURT LOOK AT THE 
FACTS. OUR POSITION IS YOU DON'T EVEN NEED TO LOOK AT THE 
RECORD BECAUSE THEY HAVEN'T MET THE BURDEN TO SHOW THIS 
IS AN EXCEPTIONAL AND UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCE. BUT EVEN IF 
YOU'RE INCLINED TO, THERE'S A VOLUMINOUS RECORD OF FACTS, 
WE SUBMIT TO THE COURT, THAT CREATE ISSUES OF FACT FOR MRS. 
POWER IN THIS CASE. THIS IS MERELY THE THIRD BITE AT THE 
SAME APPLE. 
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JUDGE YOUNG: WELL, WHAT DO YOU THINK ARE THE 
FACTS THAT HAVE ALTERED THE AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT? 
MR. HYDE: WELL, I HOPE I CAN REMEMBER ALL OF 
'EM, BUT GENERALLY THE COURSE OF CONDUCT OF HER EMPLOYMENT, 
WHICH WE'VE SET MORE FULLY IN OUR MEMORANDUM IN PREVIOUS 
MOTIONS, BUT GENERALLY HOW SHE WAS PROMISED CERTAIN THINGS 
BY HER SUPERVISORS THAT SHE WOULD BE ABLE TO GO TO THIS 
NEW JOB, THIS NEW POSITION, THE FACT THAT AT THE OUTSET 
OF HER EMPLOYMENT SHE WAS MADE SPECIFIC PROMISES ABOUT THE 
NATURE OF HER EMPLOYMENT, THE VIDEOTAPE HAS SIGNIFICANT 
AND SUBSTANTIAL STATEMENTS. THEY'RE NOT ILLUSORY. THESE 
ARE POINTED STATEMENTS ABOUT WHEN AND WHEN YOU CANNOT BE 
FIRED. AS WELL AS OTHER FACTS I JUST CAN'T THINK OF RIGHT 
NOW, BUT THEY ARE PART OF THE RECORD. 
JUDGE YOUNG: RIGHT. SO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE 
COMPANY'S COURSE OF CONDUCT--ACTUALLY, IF I FOLLOW YOUR 
THEORY, THERE ARE NOT AT-WILL EMPLOYEES IN THE DEFENDANT 
CORPORATION. 
MR. HYDE: WELL, NO, 'CAUSE I DON'T KNOW WHO'S 
SEEN THIS VIDEOTAPE. I KNOW OUR CLIENT SAW IT NUMEROUS 
TIMES. 
JUDGE YOUNG: SO YOUR POSITION IS THAT ANY 
EMPLOYEE WHO SAW THAT VIDEOTAPE WAS NO LONGER AT-WILL. 
MR. HYDE: IT DEPENDS WHAT ELSE HAPPENED. MAYBE 
THOSE EMPLOYEES HAD SUPERVISORS THAT SAID WELL, THIS VIDEO-
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TAPE, YOU KNOW, SAID THIS BUT REALLY THIS IS AT-WILL AND 
THIS IS WHAT AT-WILL MEANS. IT REALLY DEPENDS ON THE NATURE 
OF THE COMMUNICATIONS WITH THAT INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE. I 
CAN'T SPEAK FOR ALL MRS. FIELDS' EMPLOYEES. 
JUDGE YOUNG: LET ME TELL YOU WHAT MY FRUSTRATION 
IS WITH THE CASE. IT SEEMS TO ME IF YOU'RE GOING TO CHANGE 
AN AT-WILL CONTRACT YOU HAVE TO HAVE--IT BASICALLY IS ALMOST 
ALWAYS CHANGED BY SOME DIRECT COMMUNICATION TO THAT EMPLOYEE 
BY SOMEONE HAVING AUTHORITY TO ADJUST THE AT-WILL STATUS. 
I Tt S NOT JUST A GENERAL TAPE THAT GOES TO ALL EMPLOYEES. 
MR. HYDE: IT--I'M SORRY? 
JUDGE YOUNG: UNLESS THE TAPE SAYS WE MAY SAY 
AT-WILL BUT WE DON'T MEAN IT, THIS IS WHAT WE MEAN-
MR. HYDE: IN ESSENCE, THAT'S WHAT WE'RE SAYING 
THIS TAPE SAYS, THAT THEY SAY SPECIFICALLY, ALL COMPANIES 
HAVE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, THESE PROCEDURES CHANGE. 
WHAT DO NOT CHANGE ARE OUR CORE ESSENCE VALUES. NO. 4 VALUE 
IS FAIR TREATMENT OF ALL. AND FIRST OF ALL, WE NEED TO 
BACK UP. WE DON'T THINK THEY--
JUDGE YOUNG: BUT THEN IF YOU ARE GOING TO ALLEGE 
THIS DON'T YOU HAVE TO SAY THAT THIS IS NOT FAIR TREATMENT 
OF HER, MS. POWER? 
MR. HYDE: THAT'S RIGHT. THAT'S RIGHT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: AND THAT WAS DONE ON THE BASIS 
OF, YOU THINK, THAT SHE WAS FIRED FOR THE LOSS OF A DOCUMENT. 
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MR. HYDE: THAT'S RIGHT. THAT'S RIGHT. BUT 
BEFORE WE EVEN GET TO THAT QUESTION, YOUR HONOR, WE DON'T 
BELIEVE THEY ESTABLISHED AT-WILL CLEAR ENOUGH FOR AN EMPLOYEE 
TO UNDERSTAND THEY WERE AT-WILL. THE MERE FACT THAT YOU 
HAVE A DISCLAIMER BURIED SOMEPLACE IN THIS THICK MANUAL 
ISN'T DISPOSITIVE, YOU NEED TO LOOK AT THE ENTIRE MANUAL 
AND THE LANGUAGE OF ALL ISSUES ON DISCHARGING AND DISCIPLINE 
TO READ THAT IN LIGHT OF THE AT-WILL LANGUAGE. AND OUR 
INITIAL ARGUMENT, AND THE FIRST HURDLE THEY'VE GOT TO OVER-
COME IS THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE ESTABLISHED AN AT-WILL 
RELATIONSHIP AND WE SIMPLY ARGUE THAT JUST SAYING "AT-WILL" 
DOES NOT DO IT, YOU HAVE TO DESCRIBE AND EDUCATE PEOPLE 
AS TO WHAT THAT DOCTRINE MEANS. THEN, IF THEY'VE DONE THAT, 
IF THE COURT FINDS THAT'S THE CASE, THEN THEY STILL HAVE 
TO SHOW THAT THESE OTHER MANIFESTATIONS, REPRESENTATIONS 
DID NOT ESTABLISH AN IMPLI ED-IN-FACT CONTRACT. THOSE ARE 
TWO THINGS THAT THEY HAVE NOT DONE UP TO THIS POINT WITH 
EITHER JUDGE WILKINSON OR JUDGE NOEL AND WE SUBMIT THERE'S 
NOTHING DIFFERENT HERE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU, MR. HYDE. 
MR. FERRICKS: YOUR HONOR, MR. HYDE, OF COURSE, 
IS A LITTLE BIT AT A DISADVANTAGE STANDING HERE TRYING TO 
REMEMBER OFF THE TOP OF HIS HEAD ALL THE EVIDENCE THAT WE'VE 
AGGREGATED FOR THIS THAT HAS BEEN VIEWED IN THE BRIEFS AND 
WHATNOT. I WOULD BE HAPPY AT THIS POINT IN TIME TO TRY 
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TO ELABORATE ON SOME OF THOSE ELEMENTS THAT MAKE MRS. POWERS' 
CIRCUMSTANCES SPECIAL IF THE COURT WOULD LIKE THAT ELABOR-
ATION AT THIS TIME? 
JUDGE YOUNG: WELL, GIVE ME A BRIEF STATEMENT 
OF THOSE. LET ME DO THAT, MR. HIMONAS. 
MR. HIMONAS: MAY I MAKE A SUGGESTION BRIEFLY? 
JUDGE YOUNG: LET ME HEAR HIM FIRST. THANK YOU. 
MR. FERRICKS: YOUR HONOR, IN HODGSON, AS THE 
COURT NOTES FROM READING THAT CASE, THE DISCLAIMER OF AT-
WILL WAS CLEARLY UPFRONT IN THE MANUAL AND IT SAID NOTWITH-
STANDING ANY REPRESENTATIONS OF THE COMPANY YOU ARE AT-WILL 
RIGHT IN THE VERY FRONT OF THE MANUAL. ALSO IN THE INTERVIEW) 
IN HODGSON THAT PERSON WAS TOLD THAT YOU ARE AN AT-WILL 
EMPLOYEE. 
NOW, IN CONTRAST IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE MARIA-
MERCEDES POWER WAS EMPLOYED BY MRS. FIELDS COOKIES BY THE 
PERSONNEL ASSISTANT TO DEBBIE FIELDS. AND THAT PERSONNEL 
ASSISTANT AT THE EMPLOYMENT INTERVIEW TOLD HER THAT THIS 
IS A WONDERFUL PLACE TO WORK, THAT THERE ARE CAREER OPPOR-
TUNITIES FOR YOU AND NEVER SAID ANYTHING ABOUT AT-WILL. 
IN FACT, MARIAMERCEDES POWER NEVER SIGNED AN EMPLOYMENT 
APPLICATION UNTIL AFTER SHE STARTED EMPLOYMENT. IT WAS 
AN AFTERTHOUGHT TO PAPER HER FILE SO THAT THERE WOULD BE 
A RECORD IN THERE. IT DIDN'T HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE 
NEGOTIATION, IN HER PERCEPTION, OF HOW SHE STARTED HER 
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EMPLOYMENT WITH MRS. FIELDS COOKIES. SHE WAS NEVER TRAINED 
ON AT-WILL BUT SHE WAS SPECIFICALLY TRAINED ON THE PRINCIPALS; 
OF THE COMPANY THAT ARE INCOMPLETE ABROGATION OF AT-WILL. 
THE AT-WILL DISCLAIMER IN THE EMPLOYMENT MANUAL 
IS BURIED DOWN IN SECTION 7 OF THAT MANUAL WHICH IS DOWN 
ABOUT 123 PAGES, THE LAST TIME I COUNTED. I CAN'T REMEMBER 
EXACTLY WHERE IT IS, AND THAT AT-WILL DISCLAIMER IN THERE 
IS ALL WRAPPED UP AND COLLECTED IN THE SAME SECTION OF THE 
MANUAL THAT SAYS WE HAVE STAGES OF DISCIPLINE, YOU NEED 
TO GET NOTICE OF WHAT'S EXPECTED OF YOU, YOU'LL BE GIVEN 
AN OPPORTUNITY TO PERFORM, IF YOU DON'T PERFORM YOU'LL BE 
GIVEN NOTICE THAT YOU'RE NOT PERFORMING AND ADDITIONAL OPPOR-I 
TUNITIES. 
THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT MRS. FIELDS MAKES SO 
MUCH OUT OF--THESE MANUALS WERE PASSED OUT AFTER A WHILE, 
NOT AT THE BEGINNING OF EMPLOYMENT, BY THE WAY, THEY WERE 
PASSED OUT AND SHE SIGNED AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT SUGGESTING 
THAT SHE HAD RECEIVED THE MANUAL. 
NOW, THERE IS A STRONG FACTUAL DISPUTE IN THE 
CASE AS TO WHETHER SHE CHECKED THE BOX OFF OR INITIALED 
THE BOX THAT SAID "I RECOGNIZE IN RECEIVING THIS MANUAL 
I'M AN AT-WILL EMPLOYEE." THERE'S A QUESTION IN THAT QUES-
TION. IT IS A KEY PIECE OF EVIDENCE THAT THE COURT'S GOING 
TO HEAR. SHE SAID I SIGNED THIS THING SAYING I GOT THE 
MANUAL, IT WAS GIVEN TO ME, AND THE POINT WAS YEAH, I GOT 
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THE MANUAL, IT IS A RECEIPT FOR THE MANUAL, IT IS NOT A 
CONTRACTUAL INTERCHANGE WITH THE COMPANY. 
THE CONTINUED PROMISES OF HER FUTURE JOB WITH 
THE MAIL ORDER FACILITY. 
SHE RECEIVED POSITIVE JOB REVIEWS. SHE RECEIVED 
BONUSES FOR EXTRA JOB PERFORMANCE. 
AND THEN ON TOP OF ALL OF THIS, THIS VIDEOTAPE, 
I DON'T THINK, CAN BE EMPHASIZED QUITE ENOUGH, YOUR HONOR. 
THIS THING IS IN LIVING COLOR. THIS IS A VIDEOTAPE OF 
THE FORMAL PRESENTATION THAT'S GIVEN BY DEBBIE AND RANDY 
FIELDS WITH MAKE-UP, LIVING COLOR, MUSIC DUBBED IN AND OUT 
ON THIS THING. THIS IS A PRODUCTION QUALITY PIECE OF WORK. 
AND NOT ONLY DID MAR IAMERCEDES SEE THIS VIDEOTAPE AS AN 
EMPLOYEE BUT SHE TRAINED OTHER PEOPLE AND SHOWED THIS THING 
A NUMBER OF TIMES BECAUSE, AS THEY SAY IN THE VIDEOTAPE, 
THE PRINCIPALS OF OUR COMPANY NEVER CHANGE, OUR POLICIES 
AND PROCEDURES CAN CHANGE BUT THE PRINCIPALS REMAIN CONSTANT 
AND IN THAT HOUR AND 15 MINUTES THE PRINCIPALS OF THE COM-
PANY, NEVER ONCE DO THE FIELDS SAY IN THERE THAT IN SPITE 
OF ALL OF THESE PROMISES TO YOU THAT WE WILL BE FAIR TO 
ALL, THAT WE HAVE OPPORTUNITY, THAT YOU ARE A TEAM MEMBER, 
THAT YOU CAN TAKE RISK WITH OUR COMPANY AND YOU WILL BE 
REWARDED FOR THAT, NOT ONCE DO THEY SAY IN THERE, BUT IN 
SPITE OF ALL OF THOSE INCENTIVES, FOR YOU TO GIVE US YOUR 
GOOD WILL, WE RESERVE THE RIGHT TO TREAT YOU AT-WILL. 
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THEY NEVER SAY THAT IN THERE. SO YOU GET ALL OF THAT AND 
THEN ONE DAY MY CLIENT IS CALLED IN TO THE DIRECTOR OF OPER-
ATIONS OFFICE, MR. PAUL BAIRD, AND SHE IS PRESENTED WITH 
AN EMPLOYMENT REVIEW. 
JUDGE YOUNG: I DON'T APPRECIATE THE SLAMMING 
PAPERS DOWN AND SLAPPING THE DESK. 
MR. FERRICKS: EXCUSE ME, YOUR HONOR, I--
JUDGE YOUNG: I DON'T NEED ANY EMOTIONAL THINGS. 
THIS HAS GOT TO BE A RATIONAL FORUM. 
MR. FERRICKS: ALL RIGHT. SHE'S PRESENTED WITH 
THE EMPLOYMENT REVIEW THAT MR. BAIRD GAVE HER. AND THAT 
EMPLOYMENT REVIEW IS ENTIRELY AT ODDS WITH ALL OF THE 
PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT REVIEWS SHE'S RECEIVED, IT IS COMPLETELY 
AT ODDS WITH EVERYTHING SHE'S BEEN TOLD BY MR. BAIRD AND 
BY DEBBIE FIELDS AND BY DEBBIE FIELDS' ASSISTANT AND EVERY-
BODY ELSE. AND IT'S ON THE PREMISE OF THIS NEGATIVE PERFOR-
MANCE EVALUATION THAT HE SAYS, SO WE ARE TERMINATING YOU 
WITHOUT ANY WARNING WHATSOEVER, CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPALS 
THAT SHE'S BEEN INSTRUCTED ON. 
NOW, THAT'S MY EFFORT TO KIND OF SUMMARIZE THE 
EVIDENCE THAT WE ARE GOING TO PRESENT TO, AS MR. HYDE SAYS, 
THE TOTALITY OF THE EMPLOYMENT CIRCUMSTANCES. THOSE ARE 
THE SORTS OF THINGS IN THE EVIDENCE THAT ARE GOING TO COME 
IN. THE SUGGESTION THAT YOU CAN LIFT A LINE OR TWO OUT 
OF THESE VOLUMINOUS DOCUMENTS AND THAT THAT IS THE ESSENCE 
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WITHOUT ANY CONSIDERATION OF THE OTHER CONTEXT IS REALLY 
AN EXERCISE IN LIFTING OUT OF CONTEXT AND IT DOES NOT PRESENT 
THE TRUE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU, MR. FERRICKS. 
MR. HIMONAS? 
MR. HIMONAS: YOUR HONOR, WHAT I WAS GOING TO 
SUGGEST IS I BESEECH THE COURT TO READ THE RESPONSE FOR 
OUR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION BECAUSE HALF OF WHAT YOU HAVE 
HEARD IS NOT IN THE RECORD AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD 
AND I THINK THE COURT NEEDS TO TAKE A COLD, HARD LOOK AT 
THE FACTS AND NOT AT AN IMPASSIONED ARGUMENT OF WHAT THE 
LAWYERS BELIEVE THE FACTS ARE. TAKE A LOOK AT THEIR RESPONSE 
TO OUR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION AND YOU'LL SEE THAT THE RELA-
TIONSHIP BETWEEN THIS COMPANY AND MAR IAMERCEDES POWER WAS 
AND ALWAYS HAS BEEN AN AT-WILL RELATIONSHIP. I WANT TO 
TAKE ABOUT FIVE MINUTES AND RUN THROUGH THE FACTS. 
JUDGE YOUNG: LET ME JUST GIVE YOU MY CONCERNS 
NOW FROM HAVING HEARD THEIR FACTS. 
MR. HIMONAS: SURE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: IF THEY SAY THAT, FIRST OF ALL, 
AN OVERALL COURSE OF CONDUCT CAN CHANGE AN AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT 
THEN ISN'T THAT A QUESTION OF FACT? 
MR. HIMONAS: NO, YOUR HONOR. NOT IN THIS 
PARTICULAR CASE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: WHY? 
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MR. HIMONAS: MAY I APPROACH THE BENCH? 
JUDGE YOUNG: YOU MAY, YES. 
MR. HIMONAS: LET ME SHOW YOU THE ACTUAL ACKNOW-
LEDGEMENT SHE SIGNED. NOW A PARTY IS CHARGED WITH UNDER-
STANDING DOCUMENTS THEY SIGN. IGNORE THE CHECKMARKS, JUST 
LOOK AT THE SIGNATURE AND LOOK AT THE TWO PARAGRAPHS THAT 
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDE THAT, YOUR HONOR. 
JUDGE YOUNG: BUT IF THIS DOCUMENT IS NOT SIGNED 
BEFORE EMPLOYMENT DOES IT CREATE A VARYING EFFECT? 
MR. HIMONAS: ABSOLUTELY. WE HAVE THE RIGHTS 
UNDER JOHNSON AND ITS PROGENY TO UN I LATER I ALLY MODIFY THE 
TERMS OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP. EVEN IF SHE SIGNED 
IT AND IT WASN'T AN AT-WILL RELATIONSHIP WE MAY UN ILATTERALLYJ 
MODIFY. AND UNDER THE LAW IN THIS STATE HER CONTINUED 
EMPLOYMENT PROVIDES THAT CONSIDERATION FOR THAT. 
YOUR HONOR, THAT VIDEO WAS VIEWED BEFORE THAT 
WAS SIGNED AS WELL. YOU CANNOT HAVE A CLEARER STATEMENT 
OF AN AT-WILL RELATIONSHIP AND THE COMPANY, YOUR HONOR, 
THEY DIDN'T HIDE IT, THEY GAVE IT TO HER, SHE SIGNED THE 
PAPER, YOUR HONOR, AND SHE DIDN'T USE TERMS AT-WILL, THEY 
TRIED TO FIND EXACTLY WHAT IT MEANT IN THE DOCUMENT. FOR 
EXAMPLE, AT THE VERY BOTTOM, "I UNDERSTAND THAT THE COMPANY 
AND I HAVE THE SAME RIGHT TO END MY EMPLOYMENT AT ANY TIME 
FOR ANY REASON." IT'S NOT LEGAL EASE, IT'S NOT HIDDEN, IT'S 
THE LAST THING SHE READS. 
28 
U9H16 
1 IN THE MIDDLE PARAGRAPH, YOUR HONOR, "THE COMPANY 
2 RESERVES THE RIGHT TO TRANSFER, PROMOTE, DEMOTE OR TERMINATE 
3 ME WITH OR WITHOUT CAUSE AT ANY T I M E . " 
4 A L S O , YOUR HONOR, THERE'S BEEN A BIT OF A MISSTATE* 
5 MENT AS TO THE A P P L I C A T I O N ITSELF AND WHEN SHE WAS INFORMED 
6 AT THE C O M M E N C E M E N T OF HER R E L A T I O N S H I P OF THE COMPANY T H A T , 
7 IN F A C T , THE R E L A T I O N S H I P WAS A T - W I L L . A G A I N , IF I MAY 
8 A P P R O A C H , THIS IS THE FIRST PAGE OF THE E M P L O Y M E N T A P P L I -
9 CATION. AND THIS IS THE SECOND PAGE WITH HER S I G N A T U R E . 
10 SHE DIDN'T GET THAT AT THE TIME THAT SHE WAS INTERVIEWED 
11 BUT SHE GOT IT ON THE FIRST DAY OF HER EMPLOYMENT, OR THE 
12 DAY AFTER, BUT ANYWAY, YOUR HONOR, IT'S AT THE VERY COMMENCE 
13> MENT OF THE E M P L O Y M E N T R E L A T I O N S H I P . THEY STICK IT AT THE 
14 VERY TOP. THEY DON'T HIDE IT. THEY EMPHASIZE IT. AND 
15 SHE SIGNS THE DOCUMENT AGAIN, YOUR HONOR. 
16 SHE'S GIVEN A H A N D B O O K , YOUR HONOR. LET ME TELL 
17 YOU WHAT THE HANDBOOK SAYS. FOR EXAMPLE--AND THIS, BY THE 
18 WAY, THE ENTIRE HANDBOOK IS INCORPORATED AS ONE OF THE 
19 EXHIBITS TO THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO OUR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
20 PAPERS THAT I HAD INCLUDED WITH OUR MOTION, SO YOU'LL HAVE 
21 AN OPPORTUNITY TO SEE THE 20 TO 25 PAGES, NOT HUNDREDS OF 
22 PAGES THAT COMPRISE THE ACTUAL HANDBOOK. "THE COMPANY 
23 IS AN 'AT-WILL* EMPLOYER WHICH MEANS THAT ANY AND ALL TEAM 
24 MEMBERS ARE SUBJECT TO TERMINATION AT ANY TIME WITH OR WITH-
25 OUT C A U S E . A L T H O U G H WE G E N E R A L L Y WILL FOLLOW A DISCIPLINARY 
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PROCESS BECAUSE WE ARE AN AT-WILL EMPLOYER, THE COMPANY 
RESERVES THE RIGHT TO TERMINATE A TEAM MEMBER IMMEDIATELY." 
THE POINT IS, LIKE ANY OTHER EMPLOYER IN THIS STATE OR ACROSS; 
THE COMPANY. 
BUT WHAT RANDY FIELDS IN THE VIDEO IS DOING, 
AND WHAT THE COMPANY IS DOING IS SAYING HEY, WE DON'T TERMIN-| 
ATE WILLY-NILLY. OF COURSE NOT, BECAUSE THAT'S NOT GOOD 
FOR BUSINESS. WE GENERALLY HAVE A REASON. BUT THAT'S A 
POLICY AND IT IS A VERY IMPORTANT DISTINCTION TO DRAW BETWEEN 
A POLICY AND A CONTRACT. WHAT THEY'RE SAYING IS, WE HAVE 
A CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO TERMINATE YOU AT ANY TIME AND YOU 
HAVE THE SAME RIGHT TO TERMINATE YOUR RELATIONSHIP WITH 
US AT ANY TIME AND FOR ANY REASON BUT WE'LL GENERALLY FOLLOVj 
A DISCIPLINARY POLICY. AND IN LIGHT OF HODGSON, AND SANDER-
SON, AND THE REST OF THE PROGENY OF BERUBE, THAT MANDATES 
WE INTERPRET THE ENTIRE CONTRACT CONSISTENT WITH THE DIS-
CLAIMERS, YOU KNOW, I THINK, THAT'S THE OUTCOME THE COURT 
MUST REACH IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE. THE COMPANY HAS A POLICYj 
THAT IT TRIES TO FOLLOW BUT IT'S NOT CONTRACTUALLY BOUND 
TO. 
THE R.I.F., YOUR HONOR, MUCH OF WHAT YOU HEARD, 
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. AND THIS IS, IN PARTICULAR, 
WHY I INVITE YOU AND BESEECH YOU TO READ THEIR RESPONSE 
TO THE R.I.F. PORTION OF OUR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
SOMETHING, BY THE WAY, THEY HAVEN'T PROVIDED YOU IN WRITING 
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AND I THINK YOU SHOULD READ BECAUSE MUCH OF WHAT YOU'VE 
HEARD IS SIMPLY NOT TRUE. WHAT HAPPENED IS SHE WAS CALLED 
ON THE CARPET, R.I.F. ING A POSITION THAT HASN'T BEEN FILLED 
AND HER SISTER POSITION WITHIN THE SAME DEPARTMENT WAS ALSO 
R.I.F. ED AND NOT FILLED, YOUR HONOR. THAT IS UNDISPUTED. 
IT WASN'T BECAUSE SHE HAD MISPLACED A PIECE OF PAPER. THERE 
WERE FOUR OR FIVE REASONS THAT HER EMPLOYER WENT THROUGH, 
PAUL BAIRD, SAYING YOU ARE MY LOWEST PERFORMER, THESE ARE 
EXAMPLES OF WHY YOU'RE MY LOWEST PERFORMER, THIS IS JUST 
BECAUSE I HAVE TO R.I.F. A POSITION. I AM R.I.F. ING YOUR 
POSITION RATHER THAN THE COMPUTER HACKER. IT'S AN EXPLAN-
ATION, IT'S THE EMPLOYER SAYING I'VE GOT TO GET RID OF SOME-
BODY AND I'M GOING TO GET RID OF MY LOWEST PERFORMERS BECAUS^ 
I CAN'T AFFORD TO HAVE FOUR PEOPLE, I CAN ONLY AFFORD TO 
HAVE TWO, YOUR HONOR. AND THAT IS WHAT THE RECORD WILL 
DEMONSTRATE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: TELL ME THIS, MR. HIMONAS. I'M 
CONCERNED WITH WHY TWO OTHER JUDGES, IF THEY HAVE INDEED 
CONSIDERED THIS, FELT THERE REMAINED FACTUAL QUESTIONS. 
MR. HIMONAS: JUDGE WILKINSON DID NOT HAVE THE 
BENEFIT--
JUDGE YOUNG: OF THE DISCOVERY. 
MR. HIMONAS: NO, OF THIS PARTICULAR DECISION. 
AND WE HAVE THESE ENORMOUS, LEGAL CONCEPTS THAT ARE HANGING 
OUT THERE, BUT WHEN YOU GET TO SANDERSON AND HODGSON, FOR 
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THE FIRST TIME YOU HAVE SIGNED ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS IN THIS 
CASE. THESE, AS YOU HAVE HERE, YOU HAVE A DISCLAIMER UPFRONT| 
IN HODGSON. IT WAS ORAL IN THIS CASE. IT'S THROUGH THE 
APPLICATION THAT IT'S AN AT-WILL RELATIONSHIP. YOU HAVE 
A NUMBER OF EXPLICIT DISCLAIMERS, BUT MOST IMPORTANTLY IN 
HODGSON YOU HAVE A STATEMENT THAT SAYS STATEMENTS OF CONDUCT 
BY A MANAGEMENT OFFICIAL ARE NOT INTENDED AND SHOULDN'T 
BE RELIED UPON TO GIVE RISE TO A CONTRACT. AND YOU HAVE 
THAT EXACT SAME DISCLAIMER IN THIS PARTICULAR INSTANCE. 
NOW, I GRANT YOU THAT THERE'S NOTHING EARTH-
SHATTERING ABOUT THE LAW AS IT WAS PRESENTED IN HODGSON 
AND SANDERSON. WHAT IS CRITICAL IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE 
IS THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND IN WHICH IT WAS LAID. AND TO 
SAY THAT BECAUSE WE DON'T HAVE, DON'T HAVE A BRAND NEW LEGAL 
PRINCIPAL, WE SHOULD IGNORE THE FACT WE HAVE NEAR SISTER 
CASES WHEN YOU MESH SANDERSON AND HODGSON TOGETHER, YOUR 
HONOR, THERE'S SIMPLY NO REASON IN LIGHT OF THAT FACT TO 
GO ON. 
JUDGE NOEL WASN'T FACED WITH A MOTION FOR RECONSI-| 
DERATION. WE HAD ASKED JUDGE NOEL FOR A MOTION IN LIMINE, 
ESSENTIALLY, TO KEEP OUT THE VIDEO AND HE DIDN'T HAVE THE 
BENEFIT OF HODGSON AND SANDERSON AT THE TIME EITHER, YOUR 
HONOR. 
JUDGE YOUNG: WHAT DID HE RULE ON THE MOTION 
IN LIMINE? 
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MR. 
TO LET ALL THE 
ASKING FOR THE 
UNDERSTAND, WE 
HIMONAS: JUDGE NOEL'S RULING WAS, I AM GOING 
FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES IN BECAUSE WE WEREN'T 
TRIAL TO END IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE. YOU 
WERE ONLY GOING AFTER TWO PARTICULAR PIECES 
OF EVIDENCE, NOT FOR THE TRIAL TO COME TO AN END. AND JUDGE 
NOEL, I THINK, MADE A FAIRLY WISE DECISION SAYING, YOU KNOW, 
THERE HAVE BEEN ISSUES OF FACT BEFORE, I'M GOING TO LET 
EVERYTHING IN, 
CIRCUMSTANCES. 
SANDERSON CAME 
I AM GOING TO REVIEW THE TOTALITY OF THE 
BUT THAT WAS BEGUN BEFORE HODGSON AND 
DOWN. 
JUDGE YOUNG: LET ME GO OVER SOME QUESTIONS THAT 
I HAVE FOR YOU 
TION IN FORCE t 
MR. BAIRD, AND 
IF, INDEED, THE TERMINATION IS NOT A REDUC-
3UT IS ON THE BASIS OF A BAD EVALUATION BY 
HE SIMPLY SAYS THIS IS A REDUCTION IN FORCE, 
DOES THAT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT SUFFICIENT TO GO TO THE 
JURY ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE TERMINATION'S PROPER? 
MR. HIMONAS: IF THE RECORD BORE THAT OUT THAT 
WOULD BE THE CASE, BUT IT DOES NOT BEAR THAT OUT. THERE 
IS NO DISPUTE. THE POSITIONS WERE NOT FILLED. THERE IS 
NO DISPUTE ABOUT WHAT TOOK PLACE DURING THAT. AND AGAIN, 
I WOULD INVITE 
THAT ADDRESSES 
YOU TO READ OUR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PORTION 
THAT ISSUE AND THEIR RESPONSE TO THE SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT PORTION THAT ADDRESSES THAT ISSUE. NOT ARGUMENT, 
BUT THE FACTS AS THE LAWYERS PRESENTED IN WRITING WITH PROPER 
SUPPORT FROM DEPOSITIONS, AFFIDAVITS, WHAT HAVE YOU. NOT 
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LEGAL CONJECTURE ON BEHALF OF THE ATTORNEYS. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. I UNDERSTAND YOUR 
POSITION. 
MR. HIMONAS: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
JUDGE YOUNG: DID YOU DESIRE TO RESPOND ANY 
FURTHER, SINCE THIS HAS BEEN KIND OF AN INFORMAL PROCEDURE? 
MR. HYDE: JUST BRIEFLY, YOUR HONOR. UNFORTUN-
ATELY, I THINK THE COURT NOW IS AT A DISADVANTAGE BECAUSE 
YOU ARE UNFAMILIAR WITH THE CASE LIKE THE OTHER PRIOR TWO 
JUDGES WERE AND I THINK, YOU KNOW, HOW THEY CHARACTERIZE 
THE FACT HOW WE MAY CHARACTERIZE THE FACTS REALLY ISN'T 
THE CRUCIAL PART RIGHT HERE. ALL THE FACTS HAVE BEEN PRE-
VIOUSLY ADDRESSED TWICE BY JUDGE WILKINSON AND JUDGE NOEL. 
THERE'S NOTHING UNUSUAL OR EXCEPTIONAL TO NOW THROW THIS 
CASE OUT THAT HAS NOT BEEN ADDRESSED BEFORE. 
HODGSON IS NOT SIMILAR TO THIS CASE. THE ONLY 
ORAL ASSURANCE IN HODGSON WAS THE FACT THAT POLICIES AND 
PROCEDURES EXISTED. THERE WAS NO REPRESENTATION BY THE 
EMPLOYER WHEN THOSE POLICIES WOULD BE ADMINISTERED, THERE'S 
JUST A BLAND STATEMENT AT THE OUTSET OF THAT CASE BY THE 
MANAGER THAT SAID, YOU KNOW, YOU ARE AT-WILL, BUT WE HAVE 
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, DISCIPLINE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 
THERE WAS NOT A PROMISE THAT YOU WOULDN'T BE FIRED UNTIL 
YOU HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO KNOW WHY YOU WERE BEING FIRED. 
IT WAS NOT AS EXPLICIT. THE FACTS OF HODGSON ARE NOT CLOSE 
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1 TO THE FACTS IN THIS CASE. 
2 JUDGE YOUNG: LET ME SAY THIS ABOUT THAT CASE. 
3 JUSTICE HOWE SAID THAT THE ISSUE PRESENTED IS WHETHER THE 
4 MANAGER MODIFIED THE AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT STATUS--
5 MR. HYDE: RIGHT. 
6 JUDGE YOUNG: --BY DISCLOSING TO THE EMPLOYEE 
7 AT THE EMPLOYMENT INTERVIEW THAT THE COMPANY FOLLOWED DISCI-
8 PLINARY PROCEDURES. AND BY SUBSEQUENTLY ISSUING WARNINGS 
9 TO FOUR OTHER EMPLOYEES. AND THEN, AS I UNDERSTAND THE 
10 ORDER OF THE COURT AND THE RULING OF THE COURT, IT DETER-
11 MINED THAT DID NOT MODIFY. 
12 MR. HYDE: THAT'S ABSOLUTELY RIGHT. AND THAT'S 
13 WHY IT DOESN'T COME NEAR OUR CASE BECAUSE ALL THAT MANAGER 
14 SAID WAS THAT THERE WERE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES. 
15 JUDGE YOUNG: WELL--
16 MR. HYDE: THERE WAS NO PROMISE THEY WOULD BE 
17 FOLLOWED IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCE. 
18 JUDGE YOUNG: AND THEN YOU TAKE THE SANDERSON 
19 CASE AND THE SANDERSON CASE SAYS THAT IT'S GOING TO BE AT-
20 WILL, BOTH OF THESE CASES SAY AT-WILL IS AT-WILL AND IT'S 
21 GOING TO REMAIN AT-WILL. 
22 MR. HYDE: THAT'S RIGHT. ABSOLUTELY. 
23 JUDGE YOUNG: AND IT IS GOING TO REMAIN AT-WILL 
24 UNLESS THERE IS A SPECIFIC, EXPRESS PROMISE. AND IF YOU 
25 TAKE THE APPROACH THAT WAS TAKEN IN THE SANDERSON CASE, 
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THERE WAS A SPECIFIC, EXPRESS PROMISE THAT YOU WON'T BE 
TERMINATED IF YOU ARE SICK. 
MR. HYDE: THAT'S RIGHT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: NOW IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IF I WERE 
TO FOLLOW YOUR THEORY OF THIS CASE THAT ANYONE COULD COME 
INTO COURT AND SAY AT-WILL DOESN'T MEAN ANYTHING. 
MR. HYDE: NOT AT ALL, YOUR HONOR. NOT AT ALL. 
FIRST OF ALL, YOU HAVE TO CLEARLY ESTABLISH AT-WILL. AND 
JOHNSON V. MORTON THIOKOL, THE COMPANY, DID THAT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: WELL, OKAY. 
MR. HYDE: AND THERE IS NO WAY TO OVERCOME IT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. IN OUR CASE WE HAVE, 
IF THAT'S THE PREDICATE THAT YOU SAY IS THE FIRST THING, 
MR. HYDE--
MR. HYDE: YES. 
JUDGE YOUNG: --WE HAVE THE APPLICATION FOR 
EMPLOYMENT THAT THE FIRST PARAGRAPH STATES, "ALL EMPLOYEES 
OF THE COMPANY ARE AT-WILL." THIS IS BEFORE SHE'S FILLED 
IN ANYTHING. 
MR. HYDE: RIGHT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: "SUBJECT TO TERMINATION AT ANY 
TIME WITH OR WITHOUT CAUSE." 
MR. HYDE: RIGHT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THEN LATER, ACCORDING TO THE 
CHRONOLOGY, SHE GETS THE EMPLOYMENT MANUAL AND SHE SEES 
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DEBBIE AND RANDY FIELDS TAPE OF AN HOUR AND A HALF OF OUR 
INTERNAL LOYALTY, THEY TRY TO CREATE A RELATIONSHIP WITH 
THEIR EMPLOYEES, WHICH IS OBVIOUSLY VERY APPROPRIATE, BUT 
THEN SHE ACKNOWLEDGES RECEIPT OF THAT AND STATES THERE AGAIN, 
AND IT'S CLEAR IN THAT, THAT THE HANDBOOK ITSELF IS NOT 
INTENDED TO MODIFY THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP, AT-WILL 
RELATIONSHIP, PUT IT THAT WAY. AND SO IT WOULD SEEM TO 
ME INITIALLY THAT IF THE COURT WERE TO FIND THAT INITIALLY 
SHE IS AN AT-WILL EMPLOYEE THAT THE TAPE, EVEN THOUGH JUDGE 
NOEL SAID ALL THESE THINGS ARE SUBJECT TO GOING TO BE BROUGHT) 
INTO TRIAL--
MR. HYDE: WELL, JUDGE NOEL SAID MORE THAN THAT, 
BUT YOU'LL BE ABLE TO SEE THAT FROM THE ORDER. 
JUDGE YOUNG: FROM HIS ORDER? 
MR. HYDE: YES. 
JUDGE YOUNG: OKAY. BUT EVEN IF HE SAID THAT 
IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE MANUAL MAY BE SUBJECT TO A MOTION 
IN LIMINE AFTER THE COMPANY NOTIFIES HER THAT THE MANUAL 
IS NOT INTENDED TO CHANGE AT-WILL. AND SHE KNOWS THAT. 
MR. HYDE: BUT THERE IS ALSO INHERENTLY AMBIGUOUS 
STATEMENTS IN THE MANUAL ABOUT THE NATURE OF AT-WILL. WE 
HAVE TO LOOK AT IT FROM MAR IAMERCEDES POWER'S POINT OF VIEW. 
IT IS EASY FOR US TO THEORETICALLY TALK ABOUT THE DOCTRINE 
OF AT-WILL, BUT WHAT'S MAR IAMERCEDES TO THINK OF THIS. 
SHE WAS GIVEN THESE THINGS TO SIGN OFF ON. WHO KNOWS IF 
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AN EMPLOYER DESCRIBES WHETHER OR NOT AT-WILL OR WHAT THE 
NATURE OF AT-WILL IS. BUT I DON'T THINK THE COURT SHOULD 
WORRY ABOUT THEM OR THE IMPACT OF DISSEMINATING THIS VIDEO-
TAPE BECAUSE, OBVIOUSLY, THE COMPANY TRIED TO DO THAT WITH 
ITS MANUAL COMPANY WIDE. I THINK THERE HAS TO BE A 
BALANCING. 
JUDGE YOUNG: NO, I TELL YOU WHAT I'M LOOKING 
FOR, MR. HYDE. I'M LOOKING FOR SOMETHING THAT'S CONCRETE 
AND SPECIFIC THAT IS INTENDED NOT TO BE A GENERAL PHILOSOPHY 
OF THE COMPANY OR PRINCIPALS OR PRACTICES BY WHICH WE FOLLOW 
AND LIVE OR HOW WE CONDUCT OUR BUSINESS, I'M LOOKING FOR 
SOMETHING THAT MAR IAMERCEDES POWER IS DIFFERENT, JUST LIKE 
IN THE SANDERSON CASE, YOU'RE NOT GOING TO BE FIRED FOR 
THIS. NOW, IF BAIRD BRINGS HER IN AND HE SAYS WE'VE GOT 
A REDUCTION IN FORCE, WE ARE NOT GOING TO FILL THAT REDUCTION] 
IN FORCE, AND YOU ARE MY LOWEST PRODUCER, AND THAT'S SO, 
THAT'S THE WAY IT'S GOING TO BE, I DON'T THINK A COMPANY 
OUGHT TO BE SUED FOR THAT. I DON'T THINK THEY HAVE TO FACE 
THE LAWSUIT FOR THAT. 
MR. HYDE: I AGREE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THEY'RE AT-WILL. AND SO WHAT YOU'VE| 
GOT TO SHOW IS YOU'VE GOT TO SHOW SOME CHANGE IN RELATION 
TO THEIR CONTRACT. 
MR. HYDE: ABSOLUTELY. BUT AN EMPLOYEE--
JUDGE YOUNG: AND THAT CHANGE HAS GOT TO BE 
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DIFFERENT, IT'S GOT TO BE A PROMISE THAT'S MADE TO POWER, 
IT'S NOT A PROMISE THAT'S MADE TO EVERYBODY, IT'S NOT THE 
WHOLE COMPANY PHILOSOPHY, IT'S GOT TO BE A PROMISE THAT'S 
MADE TO POWERS JUST LIKE THE ONE THAT WAS MADE TO SANDERSON. 
MR. HYDE: THEN THE COMPANIES CAN'T RELY ON 
EMPLOYMENT AND BOOKS THAT IT DISTRIBUTES TO EVERYONE THAT 
SAYS WE'RE AT-WILL BECAUSE THAT'S DISTRIBUTED TO EVERYONE 
AS WELL. IF YOU'RE LOOKING FOR, YOU KNOW, PEOPLE--EMPLOYERS 
DON'T TELL EMPLOYEES INDIVIDUALLY WHAT AT-WILL MEANS, BUT 
THEY DISTRIBUTE A VIDEOTAPE WITH SPECIFIC--
JUDGE YOUNG: I WOULD VENTURE A GUESS THAT IF 
ALL OF US IN THIS COURTROOM WERE ASKED TO WRITE A REPORT 
ON AT-WILL WE MIGHT COME OUT WITH SOMETHING QUITE DIFFERENT, 
AND AN EMPLOYER, AND AN EMPLOYEE, MIGHT THINK AT-WILL REALLY 
SIMPLY MEANS THAT I HAVE THE RIGHT TO LEAVE--IF SHE HAD 
HAD THE RIGHT, IF SHE HAD RESIGNED HER POSITION, WOULD THE 
COMPANY HAVE A COMPARABLE RIGHT TO SEEK SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
FOR HER TO REMAIN EMPLOYED? LET'S SUPPOSE SHE'S WORKING 
ON A MAJOR PROJECT, WOULD THE COMPANY HAVE THAT RIGHT TO 
REQUIRE HER TO REMAIN EMPLOYED OTHER THAN THE PROTECTION 
THAT THEY MIGHT HAVE FOR TRADE SECRETS OR PROTECTION AGAINST 
DISCLOSURE OR COMPETITION IF THAT WERE, EXCLUDE THAT UNIQUE 
KIND OF SITUATION, BUT WOULD THEY HAVE A COMPARABLE RIGHT 
TO MANDATE AND GET SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OUT OF THE COURT? 
MR. HYDE: TECHNICALLY IN THE CASE LAW THAT'S 
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1 EXACTLY WHAT THE AT-WILL DOCTRINE MEANS. AND THAT'S WHY 
2 JUSTICE ZIMMERMAN SAYS IT IS NOT WORTHY OF OUR CONSIDERATION 
3 ANY MORE AND WHY YOU REALLY--HE SAYS THAT'S WHY THE IMBALANCE! 
4 IN THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP DID NOT SUPPORT THE AT-WILL 
5 NOTION BECAUSE THE AT-WILL EMPLOYERS ARE NEVER GOING TO 
6 DO THAT BECAUSE IF AN EMPLOYEE LEAVES THEY'LL JUST GET 
7 ANOTHER EMPLOYEE BECAUSE THERE ARE EMPLOYEES LINING UP. 
8 BUT THE POINT IS, A COMPANY THAT IS AS EXPLICIT AS THEY 
9 ARE IN THIS VIDEOTAPE ABOUT WHAT WE WILL NOT DO, WE WILL 
10 NOT FIRE SOMEONE FOR SOME SEEMINGLY INSIGNIFICANT REASON, 
11 THAT*S--I DON'T KNOW HOW AN EMPLOYER CAN BE MORE SPECIFIC 
12 THAN THAT. A COMPANY LIKE MRS. FIELDS IS NOT GOING TO TELL 
13 INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEES IT'S NOT GOING TO CHANGE THE NATURE 
14 OF THEIR EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP BY INDIVIDUALLY TELLING 
15 THEM, BECAUSE THEY COULD COME IN HERE AND SAY WELL, OF 
16 COURSE, IF YOUR MANAGER SAID THAT, AT-WILL OVERCOMES THAT, 
17 EVEN IF THEIR SUPERVISOR SAID YOU'RE THE BEST PERSON WE'VE 
18 EVER HAD HERE, YOU'RE GOING TO BE AROUND, YOU'RE NOT GOING 
19 TO BE FIRED FOR SOME STUPID MISTAKE, YOU'LL BE AROUND, TAKE 
20 HEART IN THAT. THAT WOULD STILL NOT FLY. 
21 JUDGE YOUNG: HOW LONG WAS MS. POWER EMPLOYED? 
22 MR. HIMONAS: ONE YEAR, ONE MONTH, ONE DAY. 
23 MR. HYDE: BUT HER PERFORMANCE--
24 MR. HIMONAS: A WEEK AND A DAY. 
25 MR. HYDE: BUT LET'S LOOK AT THE NATURE OF WHAT 
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SHE ACCOMPLISHED IN HER BEING PROMISED TO MANAGE A COMPLETELY) 
DIFFERENT FACILITY SHOWS THE COMPANY'S CONFIDENCE IN HER. 
JUDGE YOUNG: OKAY. WELL, THANK YOU. I APPRE-
CIATE THE ARGUMENTS THAT YOU'VE EACH RENDERED. I'LL TAKE 
THE MATTER UNDER ADVISEMENT AND RENDER A DECISION. 
MR. HIMONAS: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
JUDGE YOUNG: COURT'S IN RECESS. 
(WHEREUPON, THE HEARING WAS CONCLUDED). 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, EILEEN M. AMBROSE, HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I AM 
A CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER OF THE STATE OF UTAH; THAT 
AS SUCH CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER, I ATTENDED THE 
HEARING OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED MATTER AT THAT TIME AND 
PLACE SET OUT HEREIN; THAT THEREAT I TOOK DOWN IN SHORTHAND 
THE TESTIMONY GIVEN AND THE PROCEEDINGS HAD THEREIN; AND 
THAT THEREAFTER I TRANSCRIBED MY SAID SHORTHAND NOTES INTO 
TYPEWRITING, AND THAT THE FOREGOING TRANSCRIPTION IS A 
FULL, TRUE, AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION OF THE SAME. 
EILEEN ^/AMBROSE, C.S.R. 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
JANUARY 14TH, 1996 
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No. 
Randall N. Skanchy (USB #2968) 
Deno G. Himonas (USB #5483) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1500 First Interstate Plaza &r 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
F I L E D 
CJorfc of S u n n 4 County 
0*>**Y Cfcrk M:. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARIAMERCEDES POWER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RIVERVIEW FINANCIAL 
CORPORATION, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR RELIEF FROM ORDER 
Civil No. 10741 
Defendant's Motion for Relief for Order came on for argument on March 18, 
1993. The Plaintiff was represented by Russell C. Fericks and Nathan R. Hyde of Richards, 
Brandt, Miller & Nelson. The Defendant was represented by Randall N. Skanchy and Deno 
G. Himonas of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough. The Court, having heard the 
arguments of counsel and having reviewed the pleadings on file and the decision of the Utah 
Supreme Court in Sanderson v. First Security Leasing. 844 P.2d 303 (Dec. 8, 1992), and in 
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Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah. Inc.. 844 P.2d 331 (Dec. 23, 1992), is of the opinion that the 
undisputed facts establish as a matter of law that Plaintiffs employment relationship with 
Defendant was "at-will" and that, regardless, Defendant terminated Plaintiff "for cause" as 
part of a reduction-in-force. 
THEREFORE, THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES 
that Defendant's Motion for Relief from Order is granted; 
FURTHER ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES that the Court's prior ruling 
denying Defendant summary judgment on plaintiffs claim for breach of an alleged implied-
in-fact employment contract to be terminated only "for cause" (Count I) is vacated; and 
FINALLY ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES that Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is granted in its entirety. 
DATED this > S day of May, 1993. 
THE COURT ^ i T ' ^ ' / ' - v , , 
4<$ ^ 
David S. Yoiu«f ~\ /J § g f 7. 
District Cou 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Nathan R. Hyde 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
/ 
, ^ X ^ 3 ^ w ^ S « g ^ 3 S t ^ - ) 
Randall N. Sicanchy 
Deno G. Himonas 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this the 9. day of May, 1993, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing instrument to be hand-delivered upon: 
Russell C. Fericks 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Key Bank Tower, Suite 800 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
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